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Abstract: 
This paper will attempt to explore the history and function of judicial disagreement 
behaviour using information from both the Canadian Supreme Court and the US Supreme 
Court. The evolution of national high court decision making, highlights the changing role 
of courts within the political and public spheres, as well as the increasing authority courts 
have over policy. This changing role reinforces the need to study the role of courts on 
law. I will use minority opinions from the Laskin and Dickson courts to study what 
disagreement reveals about the decision making process. Judicial disagreement has 
largely been summed up into two deficient stereotypes: the dissent as "serious" 
disagreement and the separate concurrence as inferior disagreement to the dissent. I will 
dispel this fallacy by introducing the five categories created to describe a new way of 
thinking about judicial disagreement and to shatter the old stereotypes. 
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Chapter I 
The Evolution of National High Courts 
The recent appearance of more activist and powerful national high courts in democratic 
nations around the globe has generated a multitude of questions regarding the role of 
supreme courts within civilized society. As the highest appellate court in the nation, the 
Canadian Supreme Court represents the pinnacle of judicial decision making, but the 
modern Supreme Court is no longer just about interpreting the law, but is evolving into a 
dynamic and multifaceted institution capable of law creation. The judiciary has recently 
found itself the object of public scrutiny regarding the judicial appointment process. 
Demands are being made by different actors to make the appointment process more 
transparent and less unilateral instead of at the sole discretion of the Prime Minister. The 
Supreme Court has faced numerous legitimacy and accountability challenges in the last 
thirty years, all of which have contributed to the evolution of the institution into the 
modern day high court seen today. I will first start with a brief examination of the history 
of the Supreme Court in Canada and follow with a description of the emergence of the 
modern day Supreme Court. The purpose of which will lead to an explanation of the 
decision making process of Canada's highest appellate court through the analysis of the 
minority opinion. 
As constrained, strategic decision makers, Supreme Court judges have become 
active participants in the political game, exercising significant influence over the 
development of the law and political policy. The practice of judicial review provides the 
courts with the authority to declare government statutes null and void if deemed 
unconstitutional, essentially allowing the judiciary a final say over certain government 
1 
policies. The power of judicial review is not a new phenomenon, but has existed since 
the beginning on both the Canadian and the American Supreme Courts. However, it is 
only the last half of the twentieth century that the degree and scope of this tool has 
proven to be so controversial. The United States Supreme Court provides a template for 
national high courts around the world, having used human rights legislation and the 
power of judicial review to create a highly activist tribunal determined to champion the 
protection of civil liberties and human rights in the US. The socially progressive court 
debuted in the United States during the early 1950's under the leadership of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren causing a shift injudicial authority resulting in a trend duplicated by many 
international democracies. The Warren Court facilitated the American "rights 
revolution"1 that forever changed the face of civil liberties in the US, but greater still was 
the emergence of the modern activist court. The Bill of Rights helped carve a distinctive 
niche for the Courts within the political sphere by creating the judiciary as protector of 
civil liberties. This phenomenon, referred to as the judicialization of politics, has the 
decisions of the Court impacting public policy which has traditionally been a 
responsibility reserved for governments and legislatures. The US experience sparked the 
interest of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who would be a key figure in 
Canada's judicial reformation. Emulating the American "rights revolution", Trudeau's 
ambitious vision for a stronger judiciary was realized vis-a-vis his judicial appointments 
to the Supreme Court, both who and what type of judge was selected, and the patriation 
of the Constitution including the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
1
 See Charles Epp's book, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspectives. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, (1998). 
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These developments helped shape the modern Supreme Court of Canada, bringing it in 
line with our American counterparts. 
The evolution of the modern Supreme Court introduces the first main question of 
my paper - why is the role of national high courts in democracy worth studying? Once it 
has been established that high courts merit examination, this will lead into the second and 
more important portion of my paper - why focus on disagreement behaviour and how 
does it factor into the role of national high courts? 
The final judgment of a case epitomizes the judiciary's adjudicatory function, 
with the written reasons concluding the Supreme Court's responsibility with any given 
legal action. There are a number of theories that attempt to explain the judicial decision 
making process through an examination of either judicial attitudes, institutional 
constraints or the collegial nature of court life. The three dominant approaches, the 
attitudinal, institutionalist and strategic, attempt to shed light on why and how judges 
make decisions. I endeavor to use disagreement behaviour in the same way, by using the 
minority reasons to provide a more comprehensive picture of why judges decide the way 
they do and what process led up to the final outcome. With an increasing capacity to 
influence the direction and potential outcomes of public policy with the authority to 
declare null and void certain legislative material, Courts enjoy unprecedented power. 
Public scrutiny, government criticism and open debate regarding the role of courts in 
democratic society have made the judiciary more visible, calling into question many 
aspects of the institutions seemingly undemocratic nature and legitimate authority over 
the Constitution. Is it right for an appointed nine-member institution to wield so much 
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power? Despite the Supreme Court's rather high approval rating the judiciary faces a 
number of serious criticisms regarding its independent, unaccountable position within the 
democratic framework. The Court's expanding influence over policy and law draws 
public attention to the workings of the judiciary that previously went unnoticed. As 
concerned citizens it is our duty to question the functioning of political institutions and to 
ensure that the checks on power are effective. If the Courts are meant to act as a check 
on the tyranny of government, than what is protecting us from the tyranny of the Courts? 
The latest explosion of judicial activism on the modern Supreme Court is 
evidence of a growing political force emanating from the bench. This phenomenon 
breaks from the traditional view of the judiciary as simply interpreters of law. The 
creative judge signifies the arrival of a new way of thinking about the judiciary as a 
collegial body with a clear law-making function. The certainty of legal precedent is no 
longer taken for granted, but instead replaced by the acknowledgment of more than one 
potentially correct legal interpretation. With greater legal uncertainty and indeterminacy 
comes greater space for disagreement and as the legal questions that come before the 
court become more complex, disagreement becomes more prevalent and noteworthy. 
The acceptance that there is more than one correct answer for any given legal question 
has brought minority opinions into the open as a legitimate, beneficial function of judicial 
adjudication. The appropriateness of judicial disagreement has been debated since Chief 
"A recent Survey showed that 70 percent of Canadians had some degree of confidence in the courts, 
compared with only 46 percent who had the same confidence in Parliament." Greene, Ian, et al . Final 
Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 
(1998), 1. Also, taken from an Ipsos-Reid/CTV/Globe and Mail poll, released April 5 t h , 2002, Canadians 
appear to be satisfied with the Charter. In fact, three-quarters (74%) of Canadians believe that their 
individual rights and freedoms are better protected today than before the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
was enacted in 1982. And 70% Feel More Comfortable Entrusting Individual Rights and Freedoms To 
Judges Than to Politicians (21%). Source, http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1473. 
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Justice John Marshal of the US Supreme Court tried to unsuccessfully ban the practice of 
open disagreement in the early 1800's. The debate between the seriatim and per curiam 
opinion morphed into the modern struggle between the unanimous front v. the 
fragmented bench which still plagues the Court's legitimacy today. The argument 
highlights the advantages and disadvantages of disagreement on the Court while 
addressing the functions of separate opinion writing. 
A description of the functions of disagreement are readily available in 
disagreement scholarship, authored by Supreme Court judges such as Canada's Justice 
Wilson, Justice L'Heureux-Dube, and the US's Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, Justice 
Bader-Ginsburg and Justice Scalia offering a first hand discussion of the power and 
function of dissent. Scholars like Maltzman, Sprigg and Wahlbeck look at the strategic 
nature of disagreement in achieving a justice's desired policy outcome or the numerous 
scholars who educate us with their opinion on the practice. Recently a new approach to 
disagreement has been presented by Nancy Maveety in, Concurrence and the Study of 
Judicial Behavior and Charles Turner and Lori Beth Way, authors of Writing for the 
Future: The Dynamics of Supreme Court Concurrence, use the separate concurrence in a 
similar manner to my own research; it categorizes minority decisions to explain the 
purpose behind the separate opinion. Turner and Way claim that their "project is a step 
towards explaining the relationship between concurrences and majority Court opinions." 
My research attempts to build upon the relationship between minority and majority 
decisions by using both types of separate opinions, the dissent and separate concurrence 
to better understand the decision making process. 
3
 Turner, Charles and Lori Beth Way, "Writing for the Future: The Dynamics of Supreme Court 
Concurrence" American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, (2003), 4. 
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Minority opinions do not hold the authority of the court and are frequently 
discarded as irrelevant and insignificant in light of the majority decision. My position 
embraces the minority opinion and recognizes the contribution the minority opinion has 
not only on the final outcome of a decision, but the impact disagreement has on the 
process leading to a final judgment. Disagreement behavior can illustrate the true and 
complete opinion of the Court, revealing the other part of the picture. My research is 
unique in that it is the first time the frequency and patterns of minority opinions, both 
dissent and separate concurrences have been used to analyze and to garner a better 
understanding of and reveal the functioning of Court interaction on the bench while 
offering insight into such a dynamic institution. A systematic analysis of each minority 
set of reasons through two Canadian chief justiceships, Bora Laskin and Brian Dickson, 
allows me to develop a working knowledge of each justice and their habits, personalities 
and styles. My research takes each minority opinion and through its structural 
components places it into a specific category, which will eventually tell a story of its 
own. 
My research begins by first organizing disagreement into categories based on 
certain criteria or elements present within the text of each minority opinion. The twenty-
four initial categories were then collapsed into five main headings, Decision in Waiting, 
Creative, Failed Accommodation, Repetitive, and Perfunctory. Each category represents 
a hypothesis regarding the collaborative decision making dialogue that led up to the final 
outcome. What caused the minority author to write separately? Was it failed negotiation 
that could not produce a unanimous decision or did the dissenting judge simply lose the 
confidence of his colleagues which resulted in a minority opinion? The presence or 
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absence of certain structural elements in any minority decision indicates the majority and 
minority position on certain issues and can identify positive or negative relationships on 
the bench. The interdependent relationship between judges does factor into the final 
outcome of the decision making process. The Court is a collegial body with strategic 
interaction between justices playing a major role in the final product... the written 
decision. 
As Canada's court of last resort, with an increasing influence on politics, policy 
and the law, it is necessary to gain the most comprehensive and complete understanding 
of what the Supreme Court does. The American experience supplies the requisite 
background information on the transformation of national high courts into the socially 
progressive institutions of today, as well as highlighting the way judicial disagreement 
behaviour has evolved over the last two hundred years. Canada's own judicial 
reformation has increased the Courts influence over the everyday lives of its citizens 
through its decisions. Because of the Court's creative function, it is our duty to question 
the institution's role, duties and powers, particularly considering the judiciary's 
independent nature. The Supreme Court matters because it determines major doctrines of 
law that govern our daily lives. It helps create the legal rules, provides justice and 
security to Canadians and guards the Constitution from the tyranny of the majority. 
The American Experience 
It is useful to briefly summarize the influence the US has had on the evolution of 
the Canadian Supreme Court for two reasons. First, by highlighting the past struggles of 
disagreement writing on the bench, the Marshall years illustrate the progression and 
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challenges faced by the public display of minority opinions from the bench. Second, as 
the first socially progressive court, the United States Supreme Court demonstrates the 
evolution and impact the power of judicial review has had on the judiciary by means of 
the "rights revolution" beginning with the Warren Court.4 Drawing on the United States 
Supreme Court's strengths and weaknesses through the years of trial and error gives the 
Canadian Supreme Court a template by which to guide its own advancement. This is not 
to suggest that the Canadian Supreme Court is simply a product of the US experience or 
that the two courts are identical, because they are not, the similarities however, warrant a 
comparison. 
The Marshall Years: 
The United States Supreme Court (USSC) has had a dynamic and sometimes 
bumpy existence since its inception in 1789. There are two main periods in American 
judicial history which have greatly affected disagreement behavior on the Canadian 
bench; the first being the chief justiceship of John Marshall (1801-1835). It was during 
his leadership that the practice of disagreement came under fire and was almost 
extinguished. "With the arrival of John Marshall as Chief Justice, that potent 
individualism was reined in by a leader who insisted on speaking for a unified Court, 
even as the cost of vigorously suppressing the disagreement of colleagues." 5 The practice 
of seriatim opinion writing, where each justice wrote his own individual set of reasons for 
each case, was the norm for the early USSC. Although overlap and repetition of ideas 
often occurred, all sets of ideas were represented, regardless of their position in the final 
4
 Both areas will be touched on in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3, where the evolution of opinion writing 
from seriatim to per curiam will be addressed in Chapter 3 and judicialization of politics in Chapter 2. 
5
 Krugman-Ray, Laura. "The History of the Per Curiam Opinion: Consensus and Individual Expression on 
the Supreme Court" Journal of Supreme Court History, (2000), 182. 
8 
outcome. Chief Justice Marshall did not support the public display of dissention and as a 
result, he implemented a new practice of per curiam, where one decision was written on 
behalf of the 'Court'. According to Marshall, "unanimity would strengthen the 'power 
and dignity of the Court'." 6 As a result, any disagreement was left on the confidential 
conference table and all decisions were presented as a single unanimous voice regardless 
of the vote. "So high a value did Chief Justice Marshall place upon a united front that, 
according to his colleague. Justice William Johnson, he not only went along with 
opinions that were contrary to his own view, but even announced some." 7 The 
implications of per curiam were significant, as suppression of disagreement alters the 
Q 
functioning of the decision-making process. Despite Marshall's greatest efforts to quash 
visible disagreement, his approach was replaced a scant four years after implementation, 
with Justice Johnson's separate concurrence in Huidekoper's Lessee v Douglass.9 It is 
ironic that Marshall, a staunch advocate of the unanimous decision, disagreed numerous 
times, authoring nine dissents and one special concurrence, with his dissent in Ogden v 
Saunders10 widely viewed as his judicial masterpiece. 1 1 Despite Marshall's overly 
zealous control of his court, and the sometimes harsh criticisms directed at the other 
members of the Court, "Marshall's disciplined leadership solidified and increased the 
Court's power, but it also shaped a Court that continued to value its collective 
institutional power above the independent voices of its members and thus, into the start of 
6
 Kirman, Igor, "Standing Apart To Be A Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring 
Opinions" Columbia Law Review, Vol 95, (1995), 2086. 
7
 Scalia, Antonin. "The Dissenting Opinion" Journal of Supreme Court History, (1994), 35. 
8
 This will be addressed in Chapter 3. 
9
 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805) (Johnson, J, Concurring). 
1 0
 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213, (1827) (Marshall, C.J., Dissenting). 
1 1
 Bergman, Matthew. "Dissent in the Judicial Process: Discord in Service of Harmony" Denver University 
Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1, (1991), 81. 
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the twentieth century, to discourage dissent." The effect of the Marshall years shaped 
the current nature of judicial decision-making on both the American and Canadian 
national high court. 
The Warren Court: 
The second major American influence was in the 1950's with the Warren Court. 
Appointed in 1953, Chief Justice Earl Warren led his court down a socially progressive 
road that would change the nature of National High Court decision making forever. The 
USSC had suffered a legitimacy crisis with a string of bad racial discrimination cases 
reflected in the infamous Dred Scott v Sandford13 and continuing with Plessy v 
Ferguson14. Dred Scott was a slave in St. Louis in the early 1800's who filed suit against 
his owner, Irene Emerson, for his freedom 1 5. A slave who could neither read nor write, 
Scott petitioned the Court for his freedom with financial help from his original owners, 
the Blow family, and after eleven years of complex litigation, the Supreme Court of the 
United States finally passed down a decision on March 6th, 1857. The Court's majority 
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, not only denied Scott's freedom but 
went a step further and claimed that as a slave and as personal property, Scott was not an 
American citizen therefore he did not posses the right to file suit in federal court. Justice 
Curtis, authoring the lone dissent felt otherwise. It was his dissent that resonated with the 
people and would later prove to be one of the most influential dissent ever written. Used 
Krugman-Ray, Laura. "The History of the Per Curiam Opinion: Consensus and Individual Expression on 
the Supreme Court" Journal of Supreme Court History, (2000), 183. 
1 3
 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (Justice Curtis Dissenting). 
1 4 1 6 3 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Justice Harlan Dissenting). 
1 5
 http://www.nps.gov/jeff/ocv-dscottd.htm 
10 
in the landmark human rights case, Brown v Board of Education , Justice Curtis's 
dissent helped shape equality rights in the US almost a hundred years after it was written. 
Brown v Board of Education was a civil liberties case addressing racial 
segregation in American schools. A young third grade student, named Linda Brown, was 
forced to attend an all black school over a mile away from her home despite the fact that 
a white elementary school was only blocks away. Her father, Oliver Brown, tried to 
enroll Linda in the white elementary school but was refused. After seeking help from the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Browns', 
along with other black families, took the issue of racial segregation all the way to the 
United States Supreme Court. In a unanimous decision, delivered by Chief Justice 
Warren, the Supreme Court negated the "separate but equal" doctrine developed in Plessy 
v Ferguson and overturned the previous rulings of lower courts. This case would not 
only mark the beginning of desegregation in public schools all over America and spark 
the Rights Revolution in the US, but it would also initiate the transformation of the 
USSC. 
What had been a traditional, politically conservative Court resistant to change 
developed into a socially progressive force during the 1950's following the Brown 
decision. Brown opened the door and led the way for minority groups to plead their case 
in front of a sympathetic Court which was focused on civil liberties and the protection of 
minority rights, catapulting the Court into a new era of decision-making. The American 
social and political environment was primed and ready to start moving in the direction of 
racial integration, with the Supreme Court taking the first major visible step with the 
1 6
 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
1 7
 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
1 8
 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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Brown decision. Although the transition was met with some skepticism and resistance, 
Brown opened the door for other major rights advocates to take action, thus starting the 
•'rights revolution" which will be addressed later on in the chapter. Not only had the 
Court acted out of character by initiating a major social policy change by challenging the 
government's policy on segregation but also it had significantly altered its role to include 
champion of human rights. "By the late sixties, almost 70 percent of its decisions 
involved individual rights, and the Court had, essentially, proclaimed itself the guardian 
of the individual rights of the ordinary citizen." 1 9 Although the Brown case is only one of 
many that radically changed the role of the Court, the real impact occurred with the US 
Supreme Court's influence on high courts in other democracies. Never before had a 
national high court approached decision making with such an intent focus on minority 
rights. The Court's new found role within the socio-political structure attracted some 
admirers from other parts of the world and the US model became the template for other 
democracies to begin reshaping their own high courts. 
The Canadian Experience 
The 1970's marked a major shift in the Canadian Supreme Court style of 
decision-making from the old "formalism" to the new "contexualism". Formalism is the 
traditional conception of legal questions having "one and only one objectively correct 
answer, and can be established through the technical expertise of experience professional 
applying a rigorously constrained methodology." 2 0 Contexualism is the acceptance of 
potentially more than one correct answer for a given legal question, which can determine 
1 9
 Epp, Charles. The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, (1998), 2. 
2 0
 McCormick, Peter, "Blocs, Swarms and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the Modern 
Supreme Court of Canada" Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1, (2004), 105. 
12 
itself on a number of applicable factors, including the social and factual background of 
the circumstances involved. It is now accepted that this rigid interpretation is no longer 
the norm and that "many questions brought to the Court do not have a single correct 
answer, that there are a number of principles and values that have to be balanced very 
carefully against each other and that a wide range of social causes and societal 
consequences link to the fact-background of many disputes..." Prime Minister 
Trudeau's vision for a more creative Court would take years to come to fruition, as old 
members were replaced by new ones, a fresh set of ideas and a modem way of doing 
things was introduced to the Court. It appeared that a shift in the Court's mentality and 
way of thinking had been brewing since the introduction of the Bill of Rights in 1960. 
The Bill of Rights represented a possible new direction but was hampered by a very 
conservative bench with an engrained set of ideas. "Most of the justices had been on the 
bench for many years and were clearly unsympathetic with or ignorant of the public's 
changing expectations." Although it was Prime Minister John Diefenbaker who 
spearheaded the Canadian Bill of Rights with a "tentative" push towards a new role for 
the Supreme Court, his appointments did not reflect this. "In four appointments to the 
Supreme Court, the government gave no indication of leadership or new direction. Both 
the Diefenbaker government and it 1963 successor, led by Lester Pearson, continued to 
name to the Court justices who fit into the traditional mold." It would be the Trudeau 
years that would transform the Court. 
21
 Ibid, 6. 
2 2
 Snell, James G., Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, The Osgoode Society, (1985), 214. 
23
 Ibid, 214. 
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The Trudeau Impact: 
There are many factors which played a part in the evolution of the modern 
Supreme Court with two taking prominence - the appointment of Bora Laskin to the 
bench and the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Both factors were 
the product of Pierre E. Trudeau's self-proclaimed vision for Canada, which was inspired 
by the USSC and their gains in the rights revolution during the 1950's. The 1970's 
ushered in a new era for the Supreme Court. 
Trudeau strongly encouraged the implementation of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, including some major improvements not seen in the Bill of Rights. As a 
constitutionally entrenched document, the Charter would allow the notion of civil rights 
to have more political and judicial authority. The Charter was also applicable to both the 
federal and provincial governments equally. "Before the Charter, courts ensured that the 
federal government did not trample on the toes of provincial governments, and vice 
versa; the difference now is that the courts are obliged to ensure that no government 
tramples on the toes of each person." 2 4 Trudeau had been pushing for a charter-like 
document since his early years as Minister of Justice and continuing on into his two terms 
as Prime Minister. His many reasons for pushing an entrenched charter of rights 
included a strong desire for national unity 2 6 and to create "a national discourse about 
L'Heureux-Dube, Claire, "Nomination of Supreme Court Judges: Some Issues for Canada" Manitoba 
Law Journal, (1991), 603. 
2 5
 Knopff, Rainer, F.L Morton, Charter Politics. Ontario: Nelson Canada, (1992), 13. 
2 6
 Trudeau has described the Charter as "essentially testing, and hopefully establishing, the unity of 
Canada" and "defining the common thread that binds us together," overcoming "the forces of self-interest 
[that threaten to] tear us apart." Taken from Knopff and Morton's book, The Charter Revolution and the 
Court Party. Ontario: Broadview Press (2000), 60. 
14 
human rights" thus strengthening nationalism and "weaken the forces of regionalism and 
7 7 
provincialism." 
Through his judicial appointments, Prime Minister Trudeau would make 
significant contributions to, as well as greatly alter the face of the judicial institution at 
that time. With the judicial appointment process left primarily to the discretion of the 
Prime Minister, Trudeau appointed a distinct kind of judge, choosing to create a balance 
between practice and theory which had never before been done on the Court. For the first 
time, legal scholars and academics were being considered, equaling out the judges that 
7R 
had been practicing lawyers. A new dynamic on the bench emerged as was evident 
with the appearance of Bora Laskin, that would advance Trudeau's ultimate plan for the 
Court, but would however be met with hesitation by the other justices. The appointment 
of Bora Laskin to the Supreme Court in 1970 was quickly followed by his rather 
controversial elevation to Chief Justice with "Laskin's appointment (being) praised as 
Trudeau's first and most admired appointment to the Supreme Court." 2 9 
Chief Justice Bora Laskin: 
His Supreme Court colleagues met Justice Laskin's appointment to the Supreme 
Court in 1970 with some hesitation, and the controversy was further fueled by his 
elevation to Chief Justice three years later. Many questioned Trudeau's intentions for the 
appointment of Laskin because not only did he lack the traditional prerequisites 
considered necessary for appointment to the bench, but also Laskin's reputation and 
background preceded him. A professor of law at two of Canada's leading law schools, 
2 7
 Greene. Ian, The Charter of Rights. Toronto: James Lormier & Company, Publishers, (1989), 38. 
2 8
 Judges such as Justice Bora Laskin, Justice Jean Beetz, Justice Yves Pratte and Justice Gerald Le Da in all 
had academic experience and brought to the bench an innovative perspective to legal interpretation. 
29 
Clarkson, Stephen, and Christina McCall, Trudeau and Our Times. Toronto: M & S Inc. The Canadian 
Publishers, (1994), 348. 
15 
University of Toronto and Osgoode Hall Law School, he took an active interest in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, "demonstrating his own independent frame of mind when, in 
1951, he called for the Court to take advantage of its new supremacy to dissociate itself 
from stare decisis and to develop its own personality." Laskin's stance on what the role 
of the Supreme Court should be was somewhat prophetic and it would be this attitude 
that would get Prime Minister Trudeau's attention. Laskin was an academic and a Jew, 
born to Russian Jewish immigrants, which would be another oddity that would 
distinguish him from the other justices. Laskin's lack of major experience in private 
practice, his Jewish background and the first non-Christian to be named to the bench, his 
sympathetic leanings to civil liberties and strong central government, and his academic 
background all contributed to his strong influence in Pierre Trudeau's ultimate design for 
Canada. 3 1 "Laskin would provide the Supreme Court, it was hoped, with a much-needed 
intellectual vigor and with a philosophical position in constitutional law and civil liberties 
much akin to the prime minister's." 
What would cause another sensation was Laskin's appointment to Chief Justice a 
mere three years after his appointment to the Supreme Court. An unwritten tradition 
dictated that the most senior justice would fill the vacancy upon the retirement of a chief 
justice. This tradition has been disregarded only three times in the history of the Court; 
and one such time was the appointment of Bora Laskin as Chief Justice. Trudeau's 
blatant disregard for tradition did not go unnoticed, as Laskin "was the second most 
junior puisne justice, outranked in seniority by five other members of the Court, led by 
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Ronald Martland." Although not the sole cause of the rift between Martland and Laskin 
that would last for years, Martland's snub would signal the initial divide between "old 
formalist" and "new contextualist" justices on the bench. Laskin would earn his title, 
"The Great Dissenter" during the first half of his term as Chief Justice. Justice Martland, 
Justice Beetz and Justice Ritchie formed the majority coalition with Chief Justice Laskin, 
Justice Spence and Justice Dickson, a.k.a. the "L-S-D Connection", in the minority 
enough to be noteworthy. 
Laskin agreed with Trudeau's more "creative" style of judicial interpretation and 
supported his vision for a stronger judicial role in constitutional issues. "We are the 
umpire of the Canadian constitutional system - the only umpire" The Charter would 
prove to be the vehicle by which Laskin could help to fulfill Trudeau's vision for a 
stronger Supreme Court in Canada. During his eleven years as Chief Justice, Laskin 
"presided over the Supreme Court's transformation from a relatively minor factor to a 
central institution in Canada's political landscape by boldly asserting its importance as 
another branch of government." 
The Charter Revolution: 
Peter McCormick in his book, Supreme At Last: The Evolution of the Supreme 
Court of Canada outlines the Canadian Supreme Court's transformation through three 
phases. Phase one "succeeded in building a foundation for broad judicial review that 
34
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involved a very 'broad scope' for its review powers." This involved cases dealing with 
the principle of purposive interpretation. Phase two focused on Section 1 of the Charter, 
establishing the "reasonable limits" clause. The Court was still giving a broad 
interpretation of the Charter while trying to solidify "the general test for the 'reasonable 
limits' clause of Section 1 of the Charter. To oversimplify the style was to give a broad 
interpretation to the Charter right but to uphold the statute as constituting a reasonable 
limit." Phase three showed a major shift in the mentality of judicial decision-making. 
The Court was aggressively tackling new, controversial issues "in ways that challenged 
political orthodoxies.. .reading words into statutes that legislatures had deliberately 
omitted." 4 0 This fresh, confident style played well with the public. The Court was 
growing and adapting with the environment, trying to reflect the ideals and values 
paramount in Canadian culture. The Court was being "creative". 
Impact of the Charter. 
The consequence of the Charter has effected the functioning of the Court in many 
respects. Firstly, it has transformed the power of judicial review and brought the actions 
of the Court into the limelight. With increasing influence over social policy, not only did 
government take notice but the public did as well. A second effect of the Charter, which 
ties in with the practice of judicial review, is the judicialization of politics in Canada. A 
phenomenon that modern democracies are experiencing all over the world has drastically 
altered how the political game is played. "Around the globe, in numerous countries and in 
several supranational entities, fundamental constitutional reform has transferred an 
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unprecedented amount of power to judiciaries." Thirdly, the Charter has expanded the 
role of Courts to now include protection of civil liberties and human rights. Minority 
groups now look to the Courts for support and recognition as opposed to the traditional 
legislative route. Lastly, judicial decision-making looks different post-Charter than it did 
pre-Charter. As pointed out by Peter Russell when the Charter was adopted, "(A) 
charter of rights guarantees not rights but a particular way of making decisions about 
rights, in which the judicial branch of government has a much more systematic and 
authoritative role." As I will show in Chapter 4, the way Supreme Court justices 
disagreed with each other also changed with the Charter. The net effect of this evolution 
is "its tendency to judicialize politics and to politicize the judiciary." 4 2 
The impact of the Charter is undeniable as the modern Supreme Court embraced 
its new role with open arms. The contrast between the effects of the Charter compared to 
the Bill of Rights was staggering. "In the first two years in which the Court heard 
Charter appeals, the rights claimant was successful 64% of the time (9/14). By 1992, this 
figure had declined to 33% for the first 195 Charter decisions.. .the rights claimant was 
successful only 15% of the time under the 1960 Bill of Rights (5/34)." 4 3 The initial 
enthusiasm of the early Charter bench was a clear indication of where the Court was 
prepared to go. "Just as the Court's unreceptive attitude toward the 1960 Bill of Rights 
had the effect of discouraging litigation, the Court's activist jurisprudence under the 
Charter has stimulated litigation. The Court heard only thirty-five Bill of Rights cases 
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over a twenty-two year period but has decided 395 Charter cases over seventeen years." 
Although a long road lay ahead, the Supreme Court was signaling to the nation that it was 
willing to embrace a radically new, socially progressive direction. 
Conclusion: 
Tracing through a brief history of the American Supreme Court and establishing 
the immense influence it had on the progression of the Canadian institution is useful in 
understanding how decision making has evolved as a result of increased judicial power. 
Now that the basic background has been laid out by highlighting the influence of Chief 
Justice Marshall, detailing Warren's "rights revolution", establishing the heavy hand of 
Prime Minister Trudeau in the eventual emergence of Canada's modern day Supreme 
Court and demonstrating Chief Justice Laskin's contribution to the reformation of the 
institution, I can now discuss the judicialization of politics and the maturity of the 
minority opinion in greater depth. Not only has the judicialization of politics increased 
the Court's authority over government policy but it has also made Canada's high court 
more visible, raising questions regarding the legitimacy of the institution that will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter II 
The Role and Function of Canada's National High Court: 
The Creative Judge 
One of the most significant changes in the modern high court is the judicial approach to 
decision-making. No longer the stuffy, elitist institution that simply interprets the law, 
judicial decision-making has become creative, meaning judges are no longer strictly 
bound by rigid precedent but free to explore alternate interpretations and to consider 
possible new directions. Most judges have admitted the need to create law on occasion as 
opposed to simple interpretation. Although still a controversial issue and a claim some 
judges are still reluctant to make, judges no longer "simply find the law, they also make 
law." 4 5 The traditional view of judges as the "mouthpiece of the law" has become 
obsolete because of the constitutionally entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The Charter was designed to be vague, with the narrow scope and ambiguous 
nature of the legal sections intended for judicial interpretation. Flexible and innovative 
decision making has become characteristic of the modern creative Court which is in stark 
contrast to the traditional "rule of law" approach strictly adhered to by Courts in the past. 
It is now expected and encouraged that judges approach decision making with a creative 
flare and the ability to adapt and apply new meaning and precedent into contemporary 
situations. The introduction of the modern Supreme Court has altered the decision 
making process, thereby affecting all aspects of Court procedure and consequently the 
nature of disagreement behaviour. 
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In this section I will address creative decision making by the collegial Court and 
the effects of this change on the decision making style on the bench. The "creative court" 
implies a different style of decision making, highly influenced by the collegial nature of 
the Court. Collegiality denotes community and interaction on the bench, only a recently 
used description of Supreme Court decision making process. As a result of collegial 
interdependency between judicial actors on the bench, individual judges are more 
inclined to engage in strategic techniques to make decisions in order to achieve their 
preferred outcome. Strategy has profoundly altered the way appellate court judges make 
decisions; coupled with increased control over the direction of government policy via 
judicial review, the modern Supreme Court justice must contend with multiple forces 
influencing his final decision. 
Using the power of judicial review, the Charter became the vehicle by which the 
Supreme Court became an active, participating member in the political game. Judges 
however must play the game with a different set of rules than other government agencies. 
Fundamental characteristics inherent in the Canadian judicial system including judicial 
independence, security of tenure, constitutional protection and the unelected, 
unaccountable nature of judicial appointment, offer both advantages and disadvantages to 
the high court judge engaged in the political game. The Charter authorizes the Courts, as 
chief arbitrator of human rights, to play the game, but the judicial institution as a whole 
becomes more visible spurring greater public scrutiny. Greater media exposure and 
public visibility consequently calls into question the legitimacy of the Court's role in 
society and the institution's ability to adjudicate objectively, despite the perceived 
subjective nature of judicial decision making. The counter-maj oritarian argument outlines 
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some of the major criticisms faced by the Court regarding its apparent undemocratic 
nature. The Court is a great contradiction; on the one hand it is shielded from the inherent 
pressures of the political game, but on the other, judges are free to engage in public 
policy making through the use of judicial review. The judiciary enjoys the advantages of 
being a government branch but suffers none of the drawbacks of elected tenure. As 
constrained strategic policy makers, judges are performing a new and powerful function 
in the political sphere, while adjusting to an alternative decision making style, 
unparalleled by past judicial actors. As Canada's highest court evolves, the adapting 
internal procedures are reflected in the decision making process, making the study of 
decision making more imperative. 
Indeterminacy and Judicial Discretion: 
The greatest challenge the Court faces while trying to move into the new arena of 
creative decision making is getting past the traditional view of judges as simple 
interpreters of the law. That view, along with the perception that there is often only one 
correct answer to legal questions has become outdated and obsolete. Legal positivism 
postulates "law can be understood in terms of rules or standards whose authority derives 
from their provenance in some human source, sociologically defined and which can be 
identified as law in terms of that provenance." 4 6 Similar to the codes of a civil law 
system like that of the French, positive law argues that all laws and their interpretations 
can be traced back to an original, legitimate source. This process provides the necessary 
legal credibility to make the law predictable and determinate. Positivism does have its 
place on the Court, but its authority is diminished. No one would argue that judges on 
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the modern Supreme Court do not, at some point, create law. Although some critics argue 
that law creation by judges happens too often. Critics claim that the traditional strict 
adherence to precedent or original intent supplies continuity and determinacy in law, 
which is essential to positivism. The reality is that "more and more law is indeterminate 
in the sense that answers to legal questions often lie outside the black boxes of settled 
precedent and unambiguous constitutional and statutory provisions. Thus, there is not 
always one right answer to legal problems." 4 7 What is still up for debate is the 
unpredictability of the law and the infusion of judicial discretion into the decision making 
process. Higher disagreement rates could be attributed to this recent acceptance of the 
creative court because without proper boundaries and constraints to guide the legal 
jurisdiction of judges, the law may become arbitrary and therefore difficult to follow, 
leaving judges open to pursue their own policy objectives, resulting in disagreement. 
Legal realists and critical legal studies theorists have exposed the somewhat 
indeterminate nature of judicial decision making and argued that judges vote in favour of 
their preferred policy outcomes instead of voting in an impartial manner based on 
established legal rules. The uncertainty of law ultimately leads to greater disagreement. 
Rational Indeterminacy: 
The largest feature of critical legal theory is its assertion that judges arbitrarily 
decide the law. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) contends that judicial decision making is 
not rationally determinate, meaning that the "authoritative materials and their reasoned 
* 48 
elaboration by judges yield pre-existing, discoverable, right answers to legal questions." 
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With the rejection of formalism and the rule of law as a means of governing judicial 
adjudication, the law becomes radically indeterminate. Without formal legal doctrines to 
justify their decisions, judges must look elsewhere for their reasons. Instead of pointing 
to judicial discretion as the culprit, CLS writers point to politics. The basic assertion by 
CLS scholars is that "all law is politics in a narrow and disreputable sense". 4 9 People 
determine law with their own self-interest in mind; they apply the law according to their 
own policy initiatives and political preferences. "The law embodies specific political and, 
especially, economic values, such as self-interest, individualism, and advantage, and it 
reflects the personal prejudices of particular judges." 5 0 
Whether or not an individual judicial decision is indeterminate is beside the point; 
it is the potential for judicial discretion that is the cause for concern. Precedent and legal 
doctrine can be "manipulated to 'justify' an almost infinite number of possible 
rationalizations for various legal outcomes." 5 1 Although judges and officials can point to 
precedent to defend their position, it is possible to rationalize different possible outcomes. 
"Law consists of a whole variety of contradiction and inconsistencies, allowing decisions 
to go either way." 5 2 This becomes a trouble spot because judges can justify their position 
by pointing at precedent, while manipulating established legal doctrine to their own 
individual end. 
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Judicial Discretion: 
At the heart of all critical legal theory is the notion that the law is determined by 
the creativity of the judiciary in the form of judicial discretion. The judiciary now 
performs a "creative" function, which is to say that judges have more influence over the 
law, essentially creating law alongside other political actors. 5 3 It was met with much 
criticism as it rebuffed the old philosophy of original intent and rule of law as the 
standards by which the law should be determined. Original intent theory asserts that it is 
not the role of the judiciary to create law, but simply to interpret and define the law's 
original meaning, leaving law creation to the legislatures. As the role of the courts 
changed, concern arose over the development of law. Some thinkers argued that the law 
was becoming too arbitrary, too indeterminate, and too much the creation of judges. 
Much to the dismay of liberal legalists, judges were becoming political players, instead of 
insignificant bystanders to the political game. 
In the past there has been a strong belief in the rule of law and established legal 
traditions to govern the decision making process. Liberal legalism 5 4 has been the norm 
by which the law has been determined by judges, which in principle means that the rule 
of law, precedent and established legal standards govern the decision making process. It 
is not forjudges to create the law but simply to interpret its original meaning as set out by 
the constitution and legislators, and apply it to the current case. 
i) Law creation 
The introduction of judicial discretion into adjudication contravenes the original 
intent theory so engrained in the decision making process. "When the judiciary refuses to 
5 3
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be guided by original intent in its interpretation of the constitution, it exercises an extra-
constitutional and arbitrary form of power." 5 5 It is not within the legitimate mandate of 
the judiciary to indulge in law creation, but to determine the original intent of law. 
Liberal legalists argue that a divergence from the established legal norms produces 
distrust in the legal rules and logical reasoning that normally govern the judicial 
process. 5 6 The law is no longer as predictable as it once was, creating a system of rules 
that is essentially unknowable and arbitrary, defeating the security offered by the rule of 
law principle. 
Original intent theory has too many flaws to legitimately stand up as the central guide 
for judicial adjudication. Although part of a judge's adjudicative mandate is to take into 
account the initial intention of the law and its application, it cannot be the only 
consideration. The original meaning intended by the initial writer can sometimes be 
impossible to decipher, either because the rule is outdated or has been applied in so many 
different ways that a single correct answer no longer exists. It could also be the case that 
the document was designed to be interpreted and expanded on by judges as its original 
purpose. 5 7 
For practical purposes, original intent theory is far too restrictive to cover all possible 
legal situations. Changing societal norms force the law to develop and grow, allowing a 
level of flexibility during the adjudicatory process, "The Constitution was written for all 
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time and all ages. It would lose its great character and become feeble, if it were allowed 
to become encrusted with narrow, legalistic notions that dominated the thinking of one 
CO 
generation." Given the plethora of hypothetical situations that may arise in future 
cases, not to mention the number of unexpected circumstances that have already forced a 
change in legal precedent, it would be unrealistic to assume that judges should not create 
law. Critical legal theory acknowledges that "legal doctrine can neither generate pre­
existing right answers to legal questions nor cover all conceivable situations." 5 9 
Therefore it is necessary forjudges to fill the "gaps". 6 0 It is this recognition, concludes 
the critical legal theorist, which will lead to a better understanding of the law. 
b) Absence ofjudicial restraint 
Critics claim that lack of judicial restraint is a form of tyranny by the courts. This 
criticism emphasizes the need to minimize the extent to which judges make law using 
their own personal preferences to influence constitutional change. "Changing the core 
meaning of constitutional rights is a responsibility which belongs solely to the people or 
their elected representatives." 6 1 Judges are unelected, independent and unaccountable to 
the people; therefore it should not be within judicial power to alter law created by 
legitimate, elected representatives. 
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Although a valid concern, this argument puts far too much emphasis on the power 
of judicial review without considering the restraints already in place to keep the judicial 
power in check. Section 24(2) of the Charter (the exclusionary rule), section 33 (the 
notwithstanding clause), section 15 (equality rights) and section 1 (the reasonable limits 
clause) create a symbiotic check and balance on all three levels of government. "The 
absence of judicial restraint can certainly detract from the democratic quality of judicial 
decision-making, but the proper structural safeguards render the likelihood of unchecked 
judicial supremacy marginal at best." 6 3 It is inaccurate to claim that the power of judicial 
review will destroy the delicate balance between government and judiciary. The system 
is designed to prevent legislative supremacy by either actor; therefore maintaining a 
balance of power is inherent in a democracy. 
c) Democracy threatened 
Lastly, there is a concern by liberal legalists that the fundamental principles of 
democracy are threatened by judicial discretion and the absence of rule of law. Ignoring 
original intent only weakens the democratic system by threatening the very foundation on 
which it stands, namely rule by the people, which is manifested in elected representatives. 
"By engaging in these exercises of judicial 'creativity' judges act more like legislators 
and even amenders of the constitution than is neutral and objective guardians." 6 4 The 
purpose of a rigid and structured constitution is to prevent arbitrary governance, which is 
precisely the consequence of judge-made law. 
Kelly and Murphy offer a rebuttal to the criticisms of critical legal theory. They 
argue that there are a number of judicial restraints preventing an abuse of power by the 
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judiciary and that "original intent focuses too exclusively on the non-structural aspects of 
the constitutional balance of power and as a result exaggerates the fear of unchecked 
judicial power." 6 5 The judiciary also restrains the power of the other branches of 
government by acting as a check and balance, actually preserving the democratic 
principles. The argument purporting lack of judicial restraint does not hold up to the 
extensive and effective restrictions placed on judicial power not only by the Charter but 
also through judicial procedure. It is not possible for a lone justice to change the law 
single-handedly, due to the appeal process and panel judging which requires a majority. 
Also, safeguards exist allowing other branches of government to quash a bad judicial 
decision if need be. 
Others argue that disagreement strengthens democracy. Firstly, "(uncertainty in 
the law is not a cause for alarm; it is endemic to democratic societies." 6 6 It is part of 
democracy to question those principles that govern society and to encourage evolution of 
legal doctrines to remain current with the times. It is also the duty of the judiciary to act 
as a check on other government agencies to preserve the balanced coexistence that exists 
between the different levels of government and the people; "any functional democracy 
requires both freedoms and internal limits, in order to balance social forces of order and 
dissent, of the individual and collective will, and of certainty and flexibility." Multiple 
interpretations are symbolic of a fundamental freedom in democratic societies; 
"Disagreement among judges is as true to the character of democracy as freedom of 
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speech itself." Judicial disagreement is actually indicative of a healthy democracy, 
which encourages dissention and values the "marketplace of ideas" to grow and flourish. 
It would be unlikely for a dictator to invite or allow independent judges to increase their 
participation in the arena of public policy. 6 9 It would be even more unlikely for a 
undemocratic government to encourage the use of judicial review which essentially has 
the potential to usurp the powers of government. "Certainty and unanimity in the law are 
possible both under the fascist and communist systems. They are not only possible but 
indispensable; for complete subservience to the political regime is a sine qua non to 
7 0 
judicial survival under either system." 
Democracy also favours change and transformation in a way undemocratic 
nations do not. Groups are allowed to openly convene and discuss political beliefs, 
ideological positions and controversial issues without repression and can express those 
beliefs without coercion. In the same way courts are openly allowed to disagree about 
matters of legal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is charged with constitutional 
protection and is actively involved in civil liberties and issues of human rights, all of 
which must develop with the changing times. It is imperative that they have to 
opportunity to openly express disagreement to fully represent all potential viewpoints. 
"(D)issents assists in making the rule of law more transparent, since they allow courts to 
convey, in majority and dissenting reasons, the many ideas and principles that often 
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compete within a single normative system...every judge has an opportunity to participate 
fully, even while the majority decision rules the outcome." 7 1 
In the well-known Canadian 'Persons Case,' Lord Sankey articulated his now 
famous 'living tree' approach where he "stressed the necessity of interpreting 
constitutional language in light of society's changing beliefs and not just internal 
grammatical constructions and original intent of the framers." 7 2 The creative court is 
entrusted with overseeing constitutional change and ensuring it is done in an appropriate 
and controlled fashion. "Democratic principles require that we do not permanently 
privilege any particular policies or values so as to tie the hands of those who come after 
us." 7 3 The Constitution is not a rigid, lifeless document, stagnant and unchangeable, but 
instead a living document capable of development. 
Counter-Majoritarian Argument74 
I have already emphasized one major concern with the current structure of the 
judiciary, namely the power of judicial review. It is now useful to address the counter-
majoritarian argument and address its particular concerns for democracy. The three major 
elements of concern for the counter-majoritarian are the judicial appointment process, 
judicial independence and the security of tenure. The argument, broken down into its 
basic elements, claims that because the judiciary is unelected, unrepresentative, 
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independent and unaccountable, it does not meet the fundamental requirements of 
democracy. It is obvious that the judiciary does not meet the requirements of democracy, 
nor can I argue that it does. I will argue that aspects of the judiciary, although seemingly 
undemocratic, can be linked to democratic ideals. 
(D)emocracy is not just about majoritarianism; it is also about individual and 
minority rights, about limits to what even a large and determined majority can 
do. Therefore, there is a sense in which a strong and independent judiciary is 
democratic - not because the courts are overtly democratic in their organization 
or their selection or their process (they are not), but because they are the 
mechanism that serves this "other face" of democracy. 7 5 
The "other face" of democracy is key to the transformation of the judiciary after 
the Charter and the subsequent Canadian rights revolution, where the Supreme Court 
embraced the title as protector of civil liberties, which will be addressed later in this 
section. Justifying the Court's new role largely connected to the practice of judicial 
review, addresses the legitimacy crisis the Courts periodically face as new challenges 
arise. The undemocratic nature of Canada's high court is a serious issue that requires 
some explanation. 
Judicial Independence: 
Judicial independence serves two very important functions, protection from the 
government and protection from the citizens. This conflicting nature is interesting 
considering it is technically the courts job to protect these same individuals. However, by 
first protecting judges from the capricious nature of the current political party in power, 
judges are immune from having to play the political game. The political agenda is 
wrought with negotiation, bargaining and pressure from outside players, which would 
make it difficult forjudges to remain impartial. "This independence is considered crucial 
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to the ideal that in the settling of individual disputes, especially those with which the 
authorities themselves are concerned, the judge will be able to exercise his judgment so 
that the result of the case is not dictated by the powers-that-be." 7 6 The Court is 
supposedly immune from political pressure, thus eliminating the possibility of 
government influencing the Court for their own self-motivated political end. 
Courts are shielded from 'majority will' by being autonomous from the citizenry. 
Judges are appointed by government, eliminating any potential influence by the will of 
the public majority, which would potentially cause the court to succumb to public 
pressure on certain issues, taking the focus away from the truth of the law. Outside 
influence, whether by politicians or the public, acts to create an atmosphere of political 
pressure on judges. Although they should be cognizant of social values, the Courts 
should never be controlled by it. Judicial independence is a method for "defining and 
securing personal freedoms against the popular will - the one favored by champions of 
judicial review - is to assign this task to some government institution that functions at 
least somewhat outside the mainstream of the political process." 7 7 Keeping the judiciary 
independent and impartial is essential to its proper functioning. Courts can focus on the 
more important questions of law and the fundamental task of protecting minority rights, 
instead of focusing on the next election issues. 
Judicial independence does not benefit the Courts alone. Elected officials find it 
useful to turn to the Courts to decide controversial issues when it becomes too politically 
risky for politicians to choose sides. A Court can compel government to an unfavorable 
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or controversial policy direction, thus making government immune to public criticism. In 
the same way the Court can fall back on the constitution, the government can fall back on 
the Court. By allowing the two institutions to play off each other in this way, the ideals 
of democracy are strengthened by each branch fulfilling a role the other is incapable of. 
Judicial independence, some would argue, threatens democracy because the flip 
side of independence is accountability. By creating a judiciary free from any formal 
accountability you run the risk of judicial abuse of power. Judges need to be responsible 
as well as independent; "responsible, in the sense that they faithfully interpret the law 
regardless of their personal policy preferences, and independent, in the sense that they 
interpret the law regardless of the extralegislative preferences of the legislature, the 
executive, or the people." How can we guarantee a responsible judge when judges 
enjoy an incredible amount of autonomy? Judges for the most part, unlike other people 
in government or even in private businesses, cannot be fired by their superiors, do not 
have to face re-election and do not run the risk of abandonment by their customers. 
High Court judges appear to be safe from any real consequences to their actions, aside 
from the occasional threat of impeachment, which is extremely rare due to the lengthy 
and expensive process. The question remains, how do judges stay responsible to the truth 
of the law and not allow their own personal policy preferences to cloud their judgment? 
According to Duncan Kennedy in his article, Toward a Critical Phenomenology 
of Judging, most judges cannot separate their personal preferences from their initial 
impression of the law. What judges try to accomplish is a connection between their first 
Rasmusen, Eric, "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game" The Journal of Law, Economic, & 
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impression of the law and their "initial sense of how-I-want-it-to-come-out. It is this 
sense of "how-I-want-to-come-out" that directs the judge in her interpretation of the law, 
to bring about an outcome that concurs with her sense of justice. It is only when the law 
conflicts with the judges own personal preference that the judge is forced to consider the 
other available options; 1) try and justify her position in accordance with precedent or 2) 
abandon her personal preference altogether and remain true to the law. Either way, a 
judge's legal opinion is initially influenced by her subjective personal preference and the 
desire to achieve the "how-I-want-to-come-out" end. This still leaves us with the 
question, what prevents a judge from deciding a case based on personal preference even 
when the outcome cannot be justified with established law? 
Judicial Accountability: 
It is true that the judiciary has no effective means of formal accountability. The 
Courts are not bound by elections, which force them to succumb to the will of the people, 
and there are no formal mechanisms forcing the Court to adhere to public opinion. 
However, it is an inaccurate conclusion to assume that the judiciary is not restrained by 
other means. Although the judiciary is not held responsible in the same manner as 
elected officials, it is possible to show some level of accountability. Minor checks and 
balances do exist to keep judges accountable, but the consequences are far less severe 
than for an elected official who risks losing his job. The security of judicial 
independence cannot be denied, nor can the judiciary prove its equivalency to the 
accountability of the elected branch. What can be shown is the existence of a balance, 
8 0
 Kennedy, Duncan, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, taken from Hutchinson and Monahan's 
The Rule of Law. Toronto; Carswell, (1987), 141. 
36 
proving that although not entirely democratic, the judiciary is not entirely undemocratic 
either. 
The collegial court plays a major role in providing accountability on the bench. 
By creating inter-dependency between justices, a nine-member panel diminishes the 
potential for abuse by a rogue judge. Individual credibility and persuasion force judges 
to be responsible to each other to achieve and maintain a majority coalition. Judicial 
relationships are established through interaction on and off the bench, validating 
individual credibility and reputation. This knowledge contributes to the strategic tactics 
employed by judges to determine final outcomes. It becomes almost impossible for a 
single judge to perpetuate his own individual policy preference in a system designed for 
panel majority rule. Without the support of other judges, a minority objective cannot 
have any enduring impact. 
a) Accountability through dissent 
The threat and use of dissent helps to ensure judges are producing the best 
possible decisions. Separate opinion writing helps to eliminate careless mistakes and 
improves the final judgment by challenging the ideas of the majority and testing majority 
opinions; "rigorous debate improves the final product by forcing the prevailing side to 
deal with the hardest questions urged by the losing side." Open criticism challenges the 
argument of the majority, forcing it to potentially rethink and defend its ideas ultimately 
improving the quality of the law. Well-tested law is less susceptible to error and therefore 
helps to safeguard the system from manipulation and abuse of power. 
Open criticism of majority opinions through separate opinion writing makes it 
difficult forjudges to pursue personal policy preferences. With the freedom to persuade 
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a majority toward an individual political preference, judges are not immune to strategic 
game playing on the bench. The ability to direct and influence through accommodation 
and negotiation to reach a desired end is a permanent practice of the modern adjudicatory 
process. Direct abuse of judicial independence is usually taken care of behind closed 
doors and what is not, is addressed in a separate opinion for all to read. 
b) The Weakest Branch 
The credibility of the judicial system plays a major role in the legitimacy of the 
Court. Maintaining a high approval rating benefits the Court by allowing it to function in 
the manner it has grown accustomed to and helps to reinforce the authority of the 
judiciary. Jeopardizing the long-term legitimacy of the Court would be devastating to an 
institution which relies on the support of the other governing bodies as well as confidence 
from the people whom it is mandated to protect. The courts are "without sword or 
purse.. .they cannot enforce their own decisions, nor can they budget the mechanisms 
OA 
needed to implement them." Without the financial and enforcing support of the other 
branches, judicial decisions would just be a collection of pretty words. Once judgment 
has been rendered, it is a rare occasion if the Court ever follows up on the 
implementation of is decision. "Lacking fail proof means of enforcing its decisions, the 
power of the Supreme Court depends in part on the legitimacy the public affords its 
rulings." 8 5 Judges are at the mercy of the populace and therefore must be mindful of their 
reputation. With the Court's legitimacy playing such a crucial role in the effectiveness of 
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judicial authority, it is imperative that judges ensure that their legitimacy is maintained. 
"One of the most important concerns of any judiciary is its right relations with the public. 
No court can satisfy the public need for faith in the processes of justice, or can function 
with the highest efficiency without the support of public confidence." 8 6 As a result, all 
aspects of judicial decision making must be carefully balanced. "Its decisions matter 
because people - elected officials, police, public servants, ordinary citizens - think they 
ought to matter; and they would matter less if fewer people accepted this importance as 
on 
self-evident and axiomatic." Maintaining public approval goes hand in hand with 
maintaining the Courts legitimacy as a viable authority on law. 
Judicial legitimacy comes from the people's belief in the system. By keeping the 
Court in good standing with the public, judges maintain the ability to continue 
functioning with a high level of authority. The Court has become an acceptable and 
widely used institution mainly because the Courts continue to make "good" laws. If the 
Courts were to go too far and step significantly outside their prescribed authority, what 
would happen? "Some people suggest that if the court overreaches itself, if it pushes too 
far too fast in a direction that public opinion and elected officials are unwilling to accept, 
QQ 
then the widespread support it now enjoys will evaporate." Without support, the Court 
lacks authority and will eventually become ineffective. The Courts consider the will of 
the people enough to maintain their effectiveness. 
The division of powers between the two levels of government puts the Court in a 
very dangerous position that could threaten the judiciary's legitimacy. Not accustomed 
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to playing the political game, the Court is forced to tread lightly so as not to disrupt the 
delicate balance between provincial and federal relations. "By focusing on statues and 
regulations the Court placed itself in a confrontational relationship with democratic actors 
for control of the policy process in Canada, and this shift in focus intensified the 
judicialization of politics in a parliamentary democracy." As an essential part of 
federalism, the Court acts as an impartial arbiter when disputes about jurisdiction arise. 
The Court's recent influx of judicial activism, greater visibility due to the Charter and the 
resulting increased use of judicial review, has challenged the Court's claim to impartiality 
by thrusting it into the policy making arena. The Court is very cognizant of it role within 
the political sphere and attempts to respect federal and provincial jurisdiction through 
proper and acceptable use of judicial review. It must be cautious how and when it uses its 
power so as not to disrupt the balance and bring its own authority into doubt. 9 0 
c) Accountability through the written reason 
In the modern high court, in both the American and Canadian systems, the 
importance of the written reasons for a decision has developed to new heights. Once a 
case reaches the high court, the outcome is no longer the most important element of the 
decision. The reasons given for a decision become the law by setting the standard, 
creating the precedent, and affecting future generations. Bad law stems from bad 
reasons, not necessarily from bad outcomes. Judges are now writing longer, meticulously 
detailed decisions, emphasizing the need to get the reasons right through in-depth 
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persuasion. Unlike past decisions, judgment without reasons is no longer an acceptable 
practice. Blind faith in the wisdom of judges no longer exists and judges have an 
obligation and a duty to explain their opinions. Justice Binnie of the Canadian Supreme 
Court recently wrote in R v Sheppard, "The delivery of reasoned decisions is inherent in 
the judge's role. It is part of his or her accountability for the discharge of the 
responsibilities of the office. In its most general sense, the obligation to provide reasons 
for a decision is owed to the public at large." 9 1 This responsibility was echoed in R v 
Braich , thus establishing the clear legal precedent forjudges to provide sufficient 
reasons for judgments rendered. 
Written reasons by judges provide a link between the untouchable, independent 
judge and the public. Justice Binnie continued on in R v Sheppard to further establish the 
need for accountability of judges via the written reasons: 
At the broadest level of accountability, the giving of reasoned judgments is 
central to the legitimacy of judicial institutions in the eyes of the public. Decisions 
on individual cases are neither submitted to nor blessed at the ballot box. The 
courts attract public support or criticism at least in part by the quality of their 
reasons. If unexpressed, the judged are prevented from judging the judges. 9 3 
Not only does the set of written reasons supply the public with a physical copy of judicial 
decisions, but it forces judges to confidently sign their name to a decision, proclaiming to 
the world with confidence that they stand by their decision. "The publication of 
concurring and dissenting opinions summons the appellate judge to stand up and be 
counted; this disclosure is of importance in view of the otherwise secret aspects of the 
[2002] 1 S.C.C., 869. 
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deciding process." The power of these statements is critical to the establishment of the 
judiciary as an accountable body. Not only do non-judicial players feel that the Court 
should be restrained, but the Court itself desires a level of accountability and requires it 
from the other justices. The Court realizes that the credibility of the Court is bound to the 
persuasiveness of its decisions. The success of the Court's decisions potentially 
translates into public support, which is a main factor for the independence the Court 
enjoys. Judges have an obligation to report to the public through the written reason. 
Judicialization of Politics 
The judicialization of politics is a recent term coined to describe an occurrence 
that has swept through many nations around the world and refers to the dramatic 
expansion of judicial power in modern democracies. The growth of judicial power, via 
practices such as judicial review, "has also expanded in its local scope to become a 
manifold, multifaceted phenomenon, extending well beyond the now 'standard' concept 
of judge-made policy-making, through constitutional rights jurisprudence and judicial 
redrawing of legislative boundaries between state organs." 9 5 It is the increasing judicial 
intervention into the political sphere of constitutions, "core prerogatives of legislatures 
and executives in foreign, military and fiscal affairs" that has made this the "most 
significant phenomena of contemporary governance." 9 6 The dynamic nature of 
judicialization makes it an essential component to the understanding of modern national 
high courts; because it describes the evolving role judiciaries are now challenged with. 
9 4
 Stephens, Richard B., "The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort" 
University of Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, (1952), 397. 
95Hirschl, Ran, "Resituating the Judicializtion of Politics: Bush v Gore as a Global Trend" Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. XV, No. 2, (July, 2002), 192. 
96
 Ibid, 193. 
42 
The judicialization of politics normally refers to, "1) the expansion of the 
province of the courts or the judges at the expense of the politicians and/or the 
administrators, that is, the transfer of decision-making rights from the legislatures, the 
cabinet, or the civil service to the courts" or "(2) the spread of judicial decision-making 
0 7 
methods outside the judicial province proper." More accurately stated, the primary 
form is the practice of courts playing an active political role and ultimately effecting 
public policy outcomes, which traditionally has been outside of the judicial sphere of 
influence. The second form is less common, involving the expansion of non-judicial 
negotiating and decision making by actors other than judges, using quasi-judicial 
methods. Basically it involves turning something into a form of a judicial process. For 
my purposes it is not necessary to discuss this at great length, as it does not apply here. 
Conditions of Judicialization: 
Judicialization can only occur under certain political conditions. The first major 
condition is democracy. It is unlikely that judicialization of politics would occur outside a 
democratic nation, because it is improbable that a dictator would willingly give up any 
degree of power to the judiciary." A dangerous move especially if the judiciary had 
intentions of playing a more active role in the political realm, specifically in the area of 
public policy making. 
The "separation of powers" and the "politics of rights" go hand in hand to 
enhance to authority of the judiciary. Federalism requires the use of a "neutral umpire" 
to settle disputes that arise over division of powers. "For a federal division of legislative 
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powers to be effective, there must be a mutually acceptable process for settling the 
inevitable disputes over where one government's jurisdiction ends and the other's 
begins.. ." 1 0 ° The role of Courts in a liberal democracy is an obvious one; however, what 
that role is continues to change, causing disagreement over the Court's position relative 
to the other branches of government. A separation of powers structure allows a certain 
level of flexibility within the power structure, giving the judiciary a more equal footing 
with the other branches of government, putting it in a very good position to assert its 
authority. The politics of rights, namely in the form of a bill of rights, further encourages 
the judiciary to advance its authority. In this way, a bill of rights gives the Court a 
stronghold, something to call its own and forces the other branches of government to let 
the judiciary into the political game. 
Other conditions make judicialization more feasible. They include things like 
"interest groups use of the courts", "opposition use of the courts", "ineffective 
maj oritarian institutions", "perceptions of policy-making institutions", and "delegation by 
majoritarian institutions". 1 0 1 I have indicated the few I believe to be the most important, 
with the exception of the one I have left for later discussion: the willingness of judges to 
judicialize. 
There is no set formula for judicialization as it occurs naturally and for its own 
reasons. All the above conditions could be present and judicialization may never occur. 
The single most important condition necessary for judicialization is the desire for 
judicialization by the judges themselves. Unless the current judges on the Court decide 
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they should, judicialization will never happen. Judges must decide that they want to "(1) 
participate in policy-making that could be left to the wise or foolish discretion of other 
institutions, and, at least on occasion, (2) substitute policy solutions they derive for those 
derived by other institutions." The lack of desire for judicialization by Supreme Court 
justices during the Bill of Rights era was a key factor in the Bills ineffectiveness. It is 
true that the Bill lacked constitutional authority and was considered by Bora Laskin to be 
a "'quasi-constitutional document" which played a role in its demise 1 0 3 , but ultimately it 
was the judges themselves that were reluctant. "The fact of the matter was that a 
majority of the judges did not want the power of judicial review because they viewed it as 
inconsistent with Canada's political and legal inheritance." 1 0 4 The necessary attitudes 
and personal preferences of the justices are essential to understanding the progression of 
high courts from the "least dangerous branch" 1 0 5 to an active political participant. 
Judicial Review 
The power of judicial review gives courts the authority to review the decisions of 
other branches of government to determine whether or not they are consistent with the 
legal principles outlined in the Constitution. The authority to invalidate laws passed by 
legislatures, if deemed unconstitutional, puts the courts in a very precarious, yet powerful 
political position. As overseers of the Constitution, the Court indirectly becomes the 
overseer of certain areas of both federal and provincial government jurisdiction. The 
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'"essential role of judicial review in our society is to guard against certain constitutional 
transgressions which popular majorities specifically seek to impose." 1 0 6 If the Court is 
supervising the government, then who is supervising the Court? 
With little accountability, the power of judicial review raises some serious 
questions about the intention of the court, which can be evaluated in two different ways. 
The more negative assumption views the Courts use of judicial review as a means to 
advance their own policy objectives while disregarding the rule of law and stare 
decisis-™1 often associated with such criticisms is an implied abuse of power and 
subjective decision making by the Courts. The more positive explanation refers to the 
Courts simply using this power to ensure that the legislative branch is keeping within its 
proper limits as outlined in the Constitution and an abuse of power by legislatures is not 
occurring. Judicial review provides a check on the other branches of government: 
Judicial power can be abused, and so for that matter can legislative power, but I 
feel no doubt at all that the power which demands most attention from lawyers is 
administrative power. Judicial power is restrained by a most elaborate system of 
rules, precedents, appeals, etc. Legislative power is restrained by responsibility to 
the electorate. But administrative power is restrained by little unless by law. 
Personally I believe that judicial review is necessary to prevent abuse and to 
preserve fairness, and that if not carried to excessive lengths it is perfectly 
compatible with efficient administration. 1 0 8 
Authority of Judicial Review: 
Judicial review falls within the Courts jurisdiction as authorized by the 
Constitution; "Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, by declaring the Constitution of 
Canada to be the 'supreme law' and any law inconsistent with its provisions to be of 'no 
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force or effect,' gives the courts' power to invalidate unconstitutional laws an explicit 
constitutional footing for the first t ime." 1 0 9 The power of the courts to declare any statute 
null and void if deemed unconstitutional has been around since the inception of the 
Constitution and originally was met with little controversy. 1 1 0 
The American's have recognized judicial review since the Marshall Court passed 
down the famous Marbury v Madison decision in 1803. 1 1 1 Chief Justice Marshall forever 
altered the authority of the Court, by proclaiming "the Supreme Court's possession of the 
power of judicial review." Chief Justice Earl Warren and his court transformed the use 
of judicial review, using it as a tool that would help the Court take the first step towards 
the socially progressive approach used today. By allowing the Court to invalidate 
government segregation policy and forcing integration in schools in Brown v Board of 
Education, the Court positioned itself within the political game. What started as a racial 
segregation case turned into a "non-elected, independent and neutral court" stepping in to 
"correct a failure or pathology of the democratic process." 1 1 3 From there, the Court 
succeeded in becoming the protector of civil liberties and taking the lead role as the 
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champion of human rights. This precedent would allow the Warren Court to introduce 
"nationally uniform and reformed set of police procedures for dealing with the accused, a 
new national law of obscenity, profound reform of the system of electing state and 
federal legislators and a new libel law more protective of criticism of public officials." 1 1 4 
This new use of judicial review created a precedent that would eventually influence many 
national high courts, with the US Supreme Court as the leader of the "rights revolution". 
The Court had found an appropriate outlet by which to make its mark, however, it could 
not have done it alone. 
The Rights Revolution: 
A transformation of this magnitude could not happen overnight, nor can it be 
credited to only one determining factor. The modern day Supreme Court emerged 
through the efforts of a support structure that laid the foundation and paved the way for 
legal mobilization to occur. 1 1 5 According to Charles Epp in his book, The Rights 
Revolution, "strategic rights advocacy became possible because of the development of 
what I call the support structure.. .consisting of rights-advocacy organizations, rights-
advocacy lawyers and sources of financing, particularly government-supported 
financing." 1 1 6 Although it may appear to have occurred effortlessly, the Court's 
transformation could not have happened without the support structure paving the way for 
reform; otherwise change would have appeared too drastic, radical, severe, and 
revolutionary. This was evident with the Courts reluctance in Canada to applying the Bill 
of Rights in an activist manner, despite growing support for such an action. Society was 
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gradually readying itself and encouraging a socially progressive Court. Justice 
Cartwright provided the writing on the wall with his dissent in Robertson and Rosetanni v 
R.U1 His application of the Bill stated "where there was an irreconcilable conflict 
between an act of Parliament and the Bill of Rights, the latter must prevail." 1 1 8 This was 
an unprecedented endorsement of the Bill as protector of civil l iberties. 1 1 9 "Cartwright's 
dissent in Robertson and Rosetanni encouraged civil libertarians throughout Canada. 
Many saw it as the thin edge of the wedge; given time, they hoped, the entire Bill of 
Rights would one day win approval from the Supreme Court." 1 2 0 Cartwright quickly 
retracted his statements upon further reflection of the potential consequences his dissent 
would impose not only on the Court but also on government if his decision ever came to 
fruition. 
The direction of the Court was further confused by The Queen v Dry bones.121 A 
full nine-judge panel sat on this controversial case involving equality rights under the Bill 
of Rights. Joseph Drybones was charged under the Indian Act, section 94(b) with being 
intoxicated off the reserve and was fined $10. He pleaded his case all the way to the 
Supreme Court arguing that he had been denied equality before the law based on race. 
This time around, the Court, in a 6-3 vote, voted in favour of a Bill of Rights application, 
with a number of judges changing their previous position with regard to the Bill. Rights 
advocacy groups praised the Court's majority opinion and felt that reform was eminent, 
but as subsequent civil rights cases showed, change was not to be. "In the years 
117
 Robertson and Rosetanni v The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 651. 
1 1 8
 Snell, James G., Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution. Toronto: 
The Osgoode Society by the University of Toronto Press, (1985), 219. 
1 1 9
 Bushnell, Ian, The Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme Court of Canada. Montreal & Kingston, 
London and Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, (1992), 354. 
1 2 0
 Snell, James G., Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution. Toronto: 
The Osgoode Society by the University of Toronto Press, (1985), 219. 
1 2 1
 [1970] S.C.R. 282. 
49 
following the Lavell and Bedard and Morgentaler decisions, feminists and civil 
libertarian groups became disillusioned with the 1960 Bill of Rights as an effective legal 
instrument to achieve the kinds of judge-led policy reforms that they observed in the 
United States and wanted to emulate in Canada." 1 2 4 The Court was not prepared to 
commit to the demands of a socially progressive judiciary or the consequences that would 
result from an activist bench. 
Democratization of Courts: 
The support structure significantly "democratized access to the Supreme 
Court." The democratization of the courts opened up the litigation process, making it 
available to more than just wealthy corporations or government, but to the average 
citizen; "increasingly disenchanted publics turn away from elected officials towards the 
judiciary as an effective means of resolving matters of fundamental principle." 1 2 6 As a 
result, the courts were sending a message to the support structure indicating a desire to 
deal with a more socially progressive docket. Judges are forced to decide cases that are 
brought before them and do not have the luxury of seeking cases out that focus on the 
issues the Court would like to address. Instead, the court must send out signals with the 
hope that the appropriate cases are presented. The rights revolution in the US, starting 
with Brown, sent a very clear message about the potential direction the Court was 
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prepared to take. The support structure needed to take that cue and supply the 
appropriate docket. 
The democratization of courts, although seemingly undemocratic, ultimately 
strengthens democracy by representing all Canadians by becoming more accessible to 
minority groups. The rights revolution signified the first time the "courts finally began 
properly defending and protecting" individual rights. 1 2 7 Not only were the Courts 
fulfilling a role that was once vacant, but also it legitimized the need for the protection of 
civil liberties. The support structure prepared the environment for desegregation to be 
effective, presented Brown, now all the Court needed to do was take the final legitimizing 
step and make the decision. Once that step had been taken, it was the public's 
responsibility to accept and encourage the rights revolution, not only by allowing the 
Courts to fulfill their role as protector of constitutional rights, but by recognizing the 
Courts judgment as supreme law. 
Conclusion: 
The role of the Canada's national high court has changed drastically over the last 
thirty years. The emergence and acceptance of the creative judge via the introduction of 
the Charter and the judicialization of politics caused a shift in decision making style on 
the bench. The use of judicial review gave Supreme Court judges significantly more 
authority over the government directive and a heavier hand in the political game, forever 
altering the way the Court functions. Understanding the evolution of the Courts is 
applicable to the explanation of the evolution of minority decisions addressed in Chapter 
4. The eleven years leading up to the entrenchment of the Charter and the crucial first 
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six years of Charter decision making represents the emergence of the modern Supreme 
Court, with this era signifying the massive shift in Supreme Court mentality, attitude and 
opinion writing. With a solid understanding of the role and function of the Supreme 
Court, I can now move ahead with the development and functions of the minority opinion 
and disagreement behaviour. 
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Chapter III 
The Development and Functions of Disagreement 
Judges are required to make hard decisions on a daily basis. Sometimes disagreement 
may arise between judges and a fragmented decision may result. In what form judges 
express disagreement and the functions that disagreement serves is the topic of the next 
chapter. Because decision making is not an individual act but instead a deliberate 
dialogue between judges, the collegial nature of the Court plays into how disagreement 
can act as a strategic tool to influence the final outcome. The advantages and 
disadvantages of disagreement on the bench highlight the longstanding debate between 
the unanimous decision vs. a fragmented one. This section will outline the existing 
understanding of disagreement and its affects on opinion writing, as well as the evolution 
of the written opinion, including the strategic nature of the collegial court. 
Definitions: 
i) Dissent 
A dissent is an opinion that disagrees with the outcome supported by the majority. A 
judge that chooses to dissent usually disagrees with the reasons of the majority as well. 
This judge (or judges as the case may be), for whatever reason, has decided to separate 
herself from the majority. A dissent may be an extensive opinion, with full reasons and 
arguments or it may be a short paragraph simply stating a judge's desire to "respectfully 
disagree" with the majority. Either way, the dissenting judge is making a bold statement 
regarding her position toward the majority. 
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ii) Separate concurrence 
A separate concurrence is not a full split from the majority, but is disagreement with 
the majority reasons but not the outcome. It involves a judge simply disagreeing with 
one or more aspects of the reasons given by the majority, but is in full agreement with the 
outcome of the case. Sometimes a judge will feel compelled to make a major point more 
clear, which might not have been a significant point to the majority writer. This form of 
separate opinion writing has implications of its own and can be used in many different 
ways, as I will explore later. 
Disagreement comes in various shapes and sizes, both within dissent and separate 
concurrence. This statement is sometimes overlooked and it is assumed, quite wrongly, 
that these two categories adequately define what judicial disagreement looks like. 
Disagreement has traditionally been slated into two main stereotypes, the dissent as 
canonical disagreement and the concurrence as less important than the dissent. Canonical 
dissent refers to the dissent that judges write in the hope they will convince their 
colleagues and the public that the majority has made a frightful mistake and will change 
1 
the future law accordingly. The assumption that the separate concurrence is minor 
disagreement compared to the dissent has been a regular theme throughout disagreement 
literature. Although these postulations are not incorrect; some dissents are canonical and 
some concurrences are lesser than some dissents, the assertion is not completely accurate 
either. Disagreement can fall into many different categories, with numerous different 
types of dissent and separate concurrence that Chapter 4 will outline. This chapter will 
first explore what disagreement looks like in practice, with a brief historical look at the 
written reasons and the functions disagreement serves in the decision making process. 
1 2 8
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The Written Reasons: 
The practice of opinion writing can take three major forms, the seriatim approach 
used by the British, the civil law tradition of per curiam favored by the French and 
through the tumultuous Marshall period on the USSC and concluding with the current 
North American practice which involves a mixture of the two. A brief examination of the 
different approaches will show the evolution of disagreement as well as the challenges 
faced by minority opinion writing on the bench. Emphasizing the value of the written 
reasons will stress the need and necessity for the study of opinion writing in the first 
place. 
The written opinion fulfills two essential functions of the adjuratory process, by 
providing the physical external end product explaining the Court's decision and by 
offering an element of public accountability to an otherwise intangible institution. When 
a decision reaches the Supreme Court level, outcome is no longer the primary 
consideration but has become a secondary consequence overshadowed by the 
development of legal principles. The Supreme Court's essential function is not dispute 
resolution, but the examination and resolution of major questions of law. It is through the 
written reasons that the Supreme Court relays their final result to the lower courts, other 
government agencies and the public at large. Acting as the Court's link to the outside 
world, the written reasons provide leadership and guidelines signaling the direction and 
mindset of the bench. The written reasons also act as an accountability mechanism, 
requiring judges to attach their name to a set of reasons unto which they are held liable. 
Openly published written opinions, both majority and minority, do not allow judges the 
opportunity to hide behind the mask of anonymity and is "not submerged within an 
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artificially unanimous opinion." Published opinions not only substantiate individual 
reputations but also determine the credibility of the Court as a whole based on the reasons 
for judgment presented. "Public accountability through the disclosure of votes and 
opinion authors puts the judge's conscience and reputation on the line, and the 
repercussions are sometimes severe." Therefore a rational and justified set of reasons 
is necessary to protect the legitimacy of the institution. The option of disagreement 
through the signing onto a minority set of reasons or choosing to author a minority 
opinion, due to the displeasing nature of the majority, leaves little excuse for a judge not 
to stand by what he signed. In the event of disagreement, Canadian judges have the 
option to write separately, adding a whole new dimension to the decision making process 
as will be shown in this chapter. 
The Seriatim, The Per Curiam and Everything in Between: 
According to USSC Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsburg, in her article "Remarks on 
i a i 
Writing Separately," there are three patterns of appellate judgments by collegial courts. 
The British high court practice of seriatim decision writing has each justice writing a 
separate and individual set of reasons for each case rendered. This can be a very time 
consuming and repetitive practice especially if all justices are in agreement with the final 
outcome. As national high courts saw an ever-increasing caseload, it became 
increasingly difficult forjudges to keep up to their commitments, put in the necessary 
effort and supply a set of reasons for every single decision. The advantages, however, of 
the seriatim opinion are that multiple viewpoints and all considerations are represented 
with every opinion being published. The seriatim provides a clear presentation of law as 
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there is no mistaking the Court's stance on a particular issue or an individual judge's 
stance on a certain position. The stigma attached to disagreement is absent because of the 
expectation for all judges to supply separate and individual opinions. Therefore, the 
greatest challenge to seriatim opinion writing is the amount of time required to produce 
reasons for every decision and the overlap in reasons from one judge to the next. 
The per curiam decision, or "for the court" approach as seen in the French system, 
has one justice assigned to write the opinion on behalf of the Court. A single, unanimous 
decision is written, "(i)n the civil law pattern, anonymity (faceless or nameless 
judgments) and unanimity (one judgment, no divergent individual opinions) go 
together" 1 3 2, regardless of the conference vote. Unanimity provides clarity of law and a 
solid, unified, judicial front, which instills confidence in the judiciary's ability to interpret 
the law correctly. The French system, for example, believes that "the law is the law" and 
"(t)here can be but one officially correct reading" of the law. 1 3 3 This view and others like 
it feel that unanimity or at least the appearance of unanimity is essential to maintain a 
strong belief in the "rightness" of the law. Some view separate opinions as weakening 
the majority judgment and undermining the integrity of the Court . 1 3 4 However, 
unanimity can come with a cost as suppressing dissention for a false display of consensus 
can also jeopardize the integrity of the law as will be addressed in the next section. 
The American system had a taste of a per curiam court when Chief Justice John 
Marshall tried to impose a strict per curiam approach on his Court by breaking "with 
English tradition and adopted the practice of announcing judgments of the Court in a 
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single opinion." The spell was broken a mere four years later by a single, special 
concurrence and never returned to the per curiam decision. While the coup was a bold 
statement in favour of minority opinions and the inherent benefits valued by the justices, 
Marshall's original objective was not forsaken. "Marshall's disciplined leadership 
solidified and increased the Court's power, but it also shaped a Court that continued to 
value its collective institutional power above the independent voices of its members and 
thus, into the start of the twentieth century, to discourage dissent." 1 3 6 Although not 
originally as expected, Marshall's influence did result in a highly unified Court that 
continued for many years after his departure. 
The last opinion writing style describes the approach employed by Canada and the 
United States. Standard practice has an opinion for the court authored by a single judge, 
with a majority of signatures, from which individual judges sometimes disassociate 
1 ^n 
themselves in varying degrees. Referred to by Claire L'Heureux-Dube as "multiple 
voices" 1 3 8 , the Canadian tradition has struck a balance between seriatim and per curiam, 
allowing for a strong unified judicial voice in the case of a truly unanimous decision or an 
honest reflection of the Court's position in a fragmented outcome. "(D)issenting 
opinions serves the interests of the truth.. .judges who disagree with the majority point of 
view is the only truthful way to reflect the court's actual disparate opinions on the matter 
before i t ." 1 3 9 Although minor debate still continues between the two conflicting styles, "it 
would be. ..shocking in our countries, if it were seriously suggested that dissents should 
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be banned." 1 4 0 The unanimous Court is not without merit and although true consensus is 
preferable to a false sense of unanimity, balance must prevail through the use of restraint 
and wisdom. 
The Unanimous Court: 
Ideally, a unanimous decision is more favorable than a fragmented one. The 
existence of multiple voices in a single decision can create doubt in the certainty of the 
law and has the potential to diminish public confidence in the ability of SC Justices to 
accurately determine supreme law. The lack of consensus represented by multiple judicial 
interpretations creates doubt in the authority of legal doctrine as determined by a majority 
coalition. Some argue that unanimity strengthens the clarity and integrity of the law 
while others claim that disagreement serves to do the same by challenging the majority 
opinion. Before discussing the functions of disagreement behaviour, I will examine 
briefly the arguments in favour of a unanimous judicial voice. 
The Unified Voice: 
Judge Learned Hand, formerly of the United States Supreme Court, warned that a 
dissent "cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of 
judges so largely depends." 1 4 1 The traditional view of the Courts presents judges as a 
single unit, searching to find the truly correct answer to the legal questions brought 
before them. Judges are pressured, especially when hearing important cases, for the 
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"Court to speak collectively, to send a strong message." There is authority in 
unanimity and strong consensus leaves little uncertainty as to the position of the Court on 
controversial issues. A deeply fragmented panel will only signal to interested parties that 
the Court is divided, inviting criticism, skepticism and backlash, whereas a unanimous 
Court would have less difficulty justifying a controversial issue to the critics. 
Clarity of law. 
Disagreement clouds the clarity of the law by offering multiple interpretations to 
the same legal questions. "The appearance of unanimity is thought by many to buttress 
the authority of and confidence in the law." 1 4 3 The legal profession prides itself on 
predictability and determinacy of the laws that govern our great nation, but even though 
majority rules the day, several different interpretations can cause confusion. "Dissents 
create uncertainty," 1 4 4 and minority opinions only cast doubt in the minds of the litigants, 
signals dissention to the lower courts, which rely on the high court for direction and 
ultimately sends a muddled judgment to government. Precedent and rule of law not only 
provide clarity and dependability in judgment, but also offer security through procedural 
uniformity necessary to reach consistent outcomes. As the "the mouthpiece of the law", 
judges exercised minimal discretion and little room existed for variation in legal answers. 
Disagreement must be kept to a minimum because it has been "recognized over time, 
even if unconsciously, that they (Supreme Court Justices) must exercise a degree of self-
discipline in order to avoid having multiple, redundant opinions detract from the quality 
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of the Court's decisions and thereby diminish its legitimacy." 
Confidence in Judiciary: 
"The most widespread argument against dissenting opinions, however, is that they 
detract from the authority of the court." 1 4 6 When disagreement arises, the certainty of the 
law is called into question, and as a result, the justices' ability to properly decipher the 
correct meaning of legal questions is also called into question. It is the duty of the 
judiciary to determine the meaning of the law - how can the public be expected to trust 
the judiciary's capability when they cannot even agree on an outcome? "By publicizing 
dissension, the dissenting judge airs the court's dirty laundry before the public and 
undermines public confidence in the wisdom and universality of the judicial process." 1 4 7 
It is better to suppress public displays of disagreement to maintain the outward 
appearance of a confident, unified judiciary. 
A truly unanimous court would be ideal; however, unwavering consensus is 
unrealistic and difficult to achieve. "Certainty in the law and flawless adjudication are, of 
course, extremely desirable objectives; the question here, however, is not whether such 
ends shall be achieved but only whether we should seek to maintain the appearance of a 
perfection that does not in fact exist." 1 4 8 It would be implausible to assume that the law is 
perfect and an even greater stretch to assume that judges would be able to supply perfect 
interpretation. The reality is that the law is full of contradictions, ambiguity, and flaws, 
coupled with the fact that "society is continually undergoing transformation, whether it is 
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due to the advent of new technologies, globalization or growing multiculturalism, to give 
just a few contemporary examples. These challenges demand new ideas and the 
evolution of legal thought." 1 4 9 
A Court of Outspoken Individuals: 
The debate between the pros and cons of a unanimous court versus the benefits of 
disagreement has raged on for years. The point is best illustrated by the famous dispute 
between Chief Justice Marshall and Thomas Jefferson that highlights the struggle 
between unanimity and fragmentation. As already suggested, Chief Justice John 
Marshall had a significant impact on the United States Supreme Court, which in turn 
affected aspects of Canada's Supreme Court development. Marshall's vision of the Court 
was met with criticism, greatest of which came from Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson 
believed strongly in the power of disagreement and the benefits it brought to the Court, 
expressing deep concern over the false illusion of unanimity dictated by Marshall. 
Jefferson felt that "An opinion.. .huddled up in a conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, 
delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lax or timid associates, by 
a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own 
reasoning" 1 5 0 would do nothing but weaken the Court's legitimacy. Jefferson also made 
no attempt to mask his harsh criticism of Marshall's apparent dominance over his fellow 
justices, making Jefferson's condemnation double sided. 
Marshall, on the other hand, represents the desire for a unified court, where each 
decision is delivered, as if unanimous with the full support of all members. Marshall 
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favoured the power of unanimity and felt strongly that the Court's authority would only 
be strengthened by consensus. A unified front not only provides a certainty of legal 
doctrine but also the reassuring confidence a unanimous decision has on the general 
public. Simply put, a 9-0 vote looks better than a 5-4 vote, especially when dealing with 
a controversial issue. Marshall valued the principle of unanimity and strived to achieve 
it. However, Marshall's dominance over the direction of his Court was well known, 
offering an alternative motivation for Marshall's staunch desire for unanimity. Without 
open disagreement, the true mentality of the Court would remain behind confidential 
doors. 
Jefferson's primary critique of Marshall's per curiam approach claimed that 
forced unanimity conceals the true nature of the Court, which serves to undermine the 
integrity of the institution. A desire for disclosure of all opinions, not just for 
accountability reasons but also for a more comprehensive picture of where the Court 
stands on specific issues appeared to be Jefferson's rationale as the false illusion of 
solidarity masks potential alternatives by closing off the marketplace of ideas. Jefferson 
also points out that the suppression of disagreement through the "silent acquiescence of 
lax or timid associates" goes against the duty of a judge to speak out against the majority 
when their conscience compels them to disagree. The ulterior motive presents itself 
when Jefferson lectures that this is especially true in the event of a "crafty chief judge, 
who sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning." Could a 
Chief Justice wield such influence over his colleagues and use manipulation to reflect his 
desired outcome? Is it possible that Jefferson was not unreasonable in his accusations 
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regarding Marshall's "crafty" nature? Did Marshall suppress disagreement to garner 
stricter control over his Court or were his intentions dignified? 
Jefferson's dislike for Marshall is apparent and supported by historical 
evidence. 1 5 1 The turbulent relationship between the two men forces me to question 
Jefferson's motives for his attack on Marshall. Does Jefferson support the practice of 
open disagreement for its own sake and the functions it serves or does he support 
disagreement because Marshall does not? Or even deeper still, does Jefferson criticize 
Marshall so harshly simply because he does not agree with the policy outcomes that 
Marshall supports? If the Supreme Court were passing down decisions that Jefferson 
supported, would Jefferson criticize Marshall's decision to abolish public disagreement? 
On the flip side, did Marshall remove disagreement for the strength of the court or for his 
own individual purposes? These questions raise some of the concerns at the core of the 
disagreement debate. 
The Collegial Court: 
Collegiality refers to the interdependent nature of Supreme Court interaction and 
decision making. Judges are no longer viewed as simply nine individuals deciding 
independently of each other, but instead as a group that decides through an on going 
dialogue between each other as well as other political actors. Judges are constrained 
strategic policy makers, and as such, when deciding a case must take into account their 
colleague's position, the social environment, constitutional validity, other government 
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institutions and a number of other factors. The decision making process changes as a 
result of the collegial nature of the Court. 
The Collegial Game: 
The collegial game involves the strategies and maneuvers judges employ during 
the beginning and middle stages of decision making. "Because outcomes on the 
Supreme Court depend on forging a majority coalition that for most cases must consist of 
at least five justices, there is good reason to expect that final Court opinions will be the 
product of a collaborative process, what we call the collegial game." 1 5 3 After the initial 
conference where a vote is taken and the majority is assigned, the collegial game begins. 
According to Forrest Maltzman, James Spriggs and Paul Wahlbeck, experts on Crafting 
Law on the Supreme Court, the game is played in three phases - 1. The first draft of the 
majority opinion is circulated to all the panel members. Strategic tactics have already 
been employed by the majority author in the construction of the first majority draft. It is 
wise to use the information gleaned at conference from the initial vote, comments made 
by the other justices and past knowledge of individual stances on certain issues to draft an 
opinion that reflects both his or her own policy goal and the preferences of the expected 
majority coalition. This is referred to as preemptive accommodation.154 2. Next, there is 
a process of give and take between colleagues, through memos in response to initial 
drafts. It is at this point that accommodation, bargaining and compromise is discussed 
and minority authors decide if they are persuaded or will write separately. 3. Finally, all 
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opinion authors, both majority and minority circulate additional drafts in response to 
colleagues concerns, concluding with the final vote. Constant intellectual exchange and 
discussion is an ongoing process among justices and these responses play a dramatic and 
influential role in shaping the Court's final opinion. 1 5 5 
Attitudinal vs. Institutional approach: 
There are many conflicting theories attempting to explain judicial outcomes on 
the collegial court, two of the most significant are the attitudinal model and the 
institutional approach. The attitudinal model claims that "judicial outcomes reflect a 
combination of legal facts and the policy preferences of individual justices," 1 5 6 with 
Court decisions as a direct reflection of an individual justice's attitudes toward certain 
1 en 
key issues, worldviews and ideological beliefs. The institutional approach says, "the 
rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. Institutions, in other words, provide the structure within which 
1 CO 
decision making occurs and thereby affect the choices that can be made." Judicial 
independence affords judges a great deal of liberty, but as constrained strategic decision 
makers, institutional restrictions force judges to play within certain guidelines and rules. 
"The most important of these constraints is an acknowledgment that Supreme Court 
decision making is a collective enterprise among all of the justices." 1 5 9 Although both 
theories view decision making from a different perspective, the reality lies in the middle 
ground coined the strategic model. Judges are free if they chose, through judicial 
155
 ibid, 8. 
156
 Ibid, 4. 
1 5 7
 Clayton, Cornell, W., and Howard Gillman, eds. Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist 
Approaches. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, (1999), 1. 
1 5 8
 Maltzman, Forrest, James F. Spriggs II and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The 
Collegial Game. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2000), 13. 
159
 Ibid, 17. 
66 
independence and security of office, to allow their individual policy preferences to shape 
their final vote. However, the nature of the judicial institution and its relationship to 
other institutions in the political system restricts how much liberty a judge may take with 
regard to serving his own self-interest.1 6 0 Judges must forge a majority coalition in order 
to rule the day; therefore, without majority support, a judge is unable to push a personal 
policy initiative. The inherent interdependencies in judicial decision making drive the 
strategic element of the collegial game. "The strategic model implies that final Court 
opinions cannot be exclusively attributed to justices' strict reading of the law, simple 
accounting of justices' policy preferences, or strategic calculation about the response (or 
non-response) of political actors exogenous to the Court" but instead a strategic justice 
will work within the institutional constraints to persuade his colleagues, form a successful 
majority coalition, and achieve his own policy preferences in the end. 1 6 1 
Crafting Law on the Supreme Court outlines some of the major factors that 
influence and explain the strategic choices judges make when forming a coalition, joining 
the majority or deciding to disagree and write separately. These factors are the rules of 
the collegial game and are taken into consideration when a judge decides to write/sign 
onto the majority or write/sign onto the minority. The first sets of components are 
strategic in nature and are dependent upon the preferences of the other panel members. 
i) Ideology: 
The first strategic factor influencing a judge's vote is the ideological position he or 
she holds. An individual justice's own ideological position will immediately be reflected 
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in his initial vote, which will automatically categorize each justice. Next, a justice's 
ideological position relative to his colleagues with an understanding of their ideological 
preferences will factor into potential coalitions. This aspect is not hard to decipher 
considering that justices serve together on the bench for a significant number of years; the 
longer they have worked together, the easier it is to determine their ideological 
preferences. 
ii) Size of majority: 
If a clear majority has already been established, this will determine the next strategic 
move made by both the majority and any minority judges. With a significant winning 
coalition after the initial conference, the majority author holds the wild card. With a safe 
majority in tow (8-1 margin), less accommodation is necessary to maintain the advantage. 
However, with a slim majority (5-4 margin), the minority group holds the wild card; 
resulting in a greater effort by the majority author to persuade and recruit. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist of the USSC openly acknowledged that, "(t)he willingness to accommodate on 
the part of the author of the opinion is directly proportional to the number of votes 
supporting the majority result at conference..." The size of the majority coalition is a 
significant factor in the collegial game. 
iii) Alliances and Coalitions: 
Due to long-term interaction on the bench, judges develop allies and foes through 
natural ideological cleavages, manifested through voting patterns. In some cases, voting 
coalitions can become almost predictable when certain issues are tackled. It is the swing 
vote that may prove essential in determining the majority. However, other factors are at 
play when attempting to build an alliance, which must be taken into consideration. 
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"(O)ver time justices presumably learn to cooperate and engage in reciprocity, rewarding 
those who have cooperated with them in the past and punishing others." 1 6 4 A tit-for-tat 
mentality may find its way into the decision making process, highlighting the imperfect, 
petty, human nature of judges. 
iv) Accommodation, Negotiation, and Bargaining: 
Easily the greatest tactical maneuver judge's possess is the ability to accommodate or 
be accommodated is at the core of the strategic game. During phase two of the collegial 
game, if preemptive accommodation has failed, responsive accommodation takes over. 
Through a series of threats, articulated suggestions and comments, expressed uncertainty, 
and even circulated separate opinions, "justices seek to influence the actions of the 
majority opinion writer and thus shape the content of the majority opinion." 1 6 5 A majority 
author will attempt to negotiate certain concerns any minority voice may have. The 
parties involved will determine the extent and degree of compromise and how stubborn 
they intend to be. Some judges may find it easier to succumb to the majority alleviating 
the need to write separately, a time consuming effort and more work than they are willing 
to put forth. Chief Justice Stone, a defender of the right to dissent, once wrote to Karl 
Llewellyn, "You know, if I should write in every case where I do not agree with some of 
the views expressed in the opinions, you and all my other friends would stop reading [my 
separate opinions]." 1 6 6 This shows us that it is easy to disagree with elements of the 
majority, but it is significantly harder to continually write about it. Choosing the 
appropriate time to pick ones battles makes more sense than creating conflict over a 
trivial issue. 
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The level of confidence the majority author feels about the strength of his coalition or 
his strong belief in the issue at hand could result in a reluctance to accommodate the 
minority at all. With a secure 8-1 advantage, the majority author has more freedom to 
design his opinion without compromise. An exception to that rule would be where a 
controversial question of law was brought before the Court and the authority of the Court 
require a unified voice. Agreement on the outcome would put pressure on the majority to 
accommodate any minority concerns, without compromising the integrity of the decision, 
and achieve a unanimous final vote. At the end of the day, accommodation is a key 
technique in the collegial game. 
Certain contextual factors must also be considered; however, these factors are 
independent of other justices' preferences. 
i) Importance of Issue: 
Considering the "give and take" attitude on the bench, it is not uncommon for a judge 
to concede his position to the majority on issues that may be more important to one judge 
than another. "In unimportant cases, justices may be willing to ignore their preferences 
and thus create an illusion of consensus. This is suggested in a memo from Chief Justice 
Warren Burger to Justice Hugo Black in 1971: T do not really agree but the case is 
narrow and unimportant except to this one man.. .1 will join up with you in spite of my 
reservations." 1 6 7 A controversial case may benefit from a unified front to carry and 
strengthen the position and authority of the Court. The legitimacy of the Court's 
decisions affects all judges equally; for the sake of the Court's reputation, all justices 
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would strive to achieve unanimity on a contentious issue and speak with one solid voice 
on behalf of the Court. 
ii) Complexity of Case and Workload: 
Some cases are more difficult than others. The degree of effort required to do the 
requisite background and necessary research, to deal with negotiations and the time 
necessary to write a minority opinion on a complex case, would factor into a decision to 
write separately. The current caseload of a judge would require prioritization of 
opinions, sometimes forcing a judge to forgo a written disagreement. "Thus, from the 
standpoint of each appellate judge on such a court attempting to manage his or her heavy 
opinion workload as efficiently as possible and to minimize any unnecessary or extra 
work, there is a built-in disincentive for the judges to take on the extra burden of 
preparing a dissent." 
iii) Institutional Position of Judge: 
Where a judge ranks on the judicial hierarchy may affect her desire to disagree. A 
"freshman" judge, newly appointed to the bench, may be more comfortable following her 
more senior colleagues as opposed to leading the minority. A probationary period may 
also force a junior judge to prove herself to the rest of the Court before any sort of 
leadership role can be taken. This will not affect her ability to write a minority, but it 
may influence her chances of writing a majority opinion. Although the Chief Justice's 
opinion does not technically possess more power than her colleagues, she does perform a 
leadership role. There may be pressure on the Chief Justice to "protect and enhance the 
Flanders, Robert G. Jr., "The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts of Last Resort: 
Why Dissents Are Valuable" Roger Williams University Law Review, Vol. 4, (1999), 401. 
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Court's reputation by producing unanimous opinions, suppressing conflict, and otherwise 
facilitate harmony on the Court." 1 6 9 
iv) Time Pressures: 
With increasing caseloads and an ever-expanding docket, all judges are restricted by 
time. While "some judges are more prone to indulge their individuality than others, all 
operate under one intensely practical constraint: time." Arrangements can be made as 
some justice may only disagree if another writes the reasons with the promise of a 
signature. The costs associated with delay must also be taken into consideration as 
accommodation and bargaining will slow down the process and impede the final 
outcome. 
v) Principled Choice: 
A judge's own personal attitude towards the practice of disagreement will govern the 
degree and frequency with which he chooses to write separately. As the minority opinion 
continues to be a common occurrence on the modern day Supreme Court and is an 
integral part of the decision making process, it would be hard to argue against the 
practice. However, small cleavages still exist separating those that favour disagreement 
with those that choose to use it sparingly. An advocate of the practice will tend to 
disagree more readily and with less reservation, resulting in more frequent minority 
opinions. This type of judge believes in disagreement for disagreement sake and values 
the benefits of separate opinion writing as outlined in the functions of disagreement. An 
advocate of unanimity will support the unanimous decision and will disagree less often, 
doing so only when they feel it is absolutely necessary. This results in fewer minority 
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opinions, a greater willingness to accommodate and would concede his own individual 
position for the sake of the Court. "Concern for the well-being of the court, on which one 
serves, for the authority and respect, its pronouncements command, may be the most 
171 
powerful deterrent to writing separately." Where a judge stands with regard to the 
practice of disagreement may not prevent a judge from never disagreeing, but will 
ultimately affect her desire to agree or disagree. 
vi) Conscience: 
Ideally disagreement should only occur out of absolute necessity with an appeal to the 
"brooding spirit of the ages". A judge feels absolutely compelled to write for fear a 
horrendous mistake is being made by the majority and a voice of reason must break 
through the barrier to offer hope and reassurance that all is not lost. In this capacity, a 
judge is fulfilling her duty to produce the best possible law by questioning the rationale 
of the majority. However, not all minority reasons are intended to appeal to the 
"brooding spirit of the ages" but are in fact written for less impressive reasons; difference 
of opinion about a word or phrase can be enough to produce a separate set of reasons. 
vii) Disassociation: 
A judge may want to disassociate himself from the majority opinion for a number of 
different reasons. All decisions are made public and published for the world to read; 
therefore, it is prudent that judges only sign their name to a decision they are comfortable 
defending, otherwise they have the option of authoring or signing onto a minority 
opinion. When a judge feels the majority just plain got it wrong, and accommodation and 
negotiation have failed, he may write a minority opinion to distance himself from the 
majority. 
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Disagreement can also occur due to personality conflicts between judges. It would be 
too bold a statement to claim that a judge would disagree solely for that reason; it is 
possible that hostility between colleagues may impact voting behaviour. Because 
"justices are engaged in long-term interactions with their colleagues and thus are likely to 
adopt tit-for-tat strategies.. .justices are likely to reward colleagues who have cooperated 
with them in the past and punish those who have not." 
Making a stand on a certain issue may require years of persistence and dedication. 
"As a court we sometimes have to allow new arguments to be distilled and gradually 
come to be accepted by the community" as well as by the other justices on the bench, and 
"(t)he successful adoption of a particular doctrine may take years and many visits to the 
Court." 1 7 3 With this in mind, a judge on the minority end of the argument is obliged, for 
credibility and consistency reasons, to take a similar stance in future cases. 
viii) Pleasure Factor: 
There is something liberating about the idea of an unrestrained, uninhibited dissenting 
voice, free from boundaries and limitations. "To be able to write an opinion solely for 
oneself without the need to accommodate, to any degree whatever, the more-or-less-
differing views of one's colleagues; to address precisely the points of law that one 
considers important and no others; to express precisely the degree of quibble, or 
foreboding, or disbelief, or indignation that one believes the majority's disposition should 
engender - that is indeed an unparalleled pleasure." 1 7 4 This may be an unrealistic fantasy, 
but it is an exciting thought. On a more realistic level, Justice William O. Douglas of the 
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USSC believed that "(t)he right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable for a 
judge on an appellate court." His reasoning was that the freedom to disagree when 
need be made decision making on the bench more agreeable, allowing judges an 
unrestrained ability to properly explore all options in an attempt to fulfill their duty and 
obligations as adjudicators. 
Functions of Disagreement: 
The practice of disagreement is a significant feature in the decision making 
process. An ideal outcome is a unanimous decision that carries the weight and authority 
of all the panel members. It is in the best interests of a majority author to secure, if 
possible, a unanimous vote not just for workload reasons, but also because of the strength 
a unanimous decision carries. With this in mind, the threat of disagreement can be a very 
powerful tool for a judge in a minority position. However, disagreement is not just a 
bargaining chip but brings to the decision making table some valuable functions. 
i) Improve the Majority Opinion 
Justice William Brennan formally of the United States Supreme Court suggested 
that strong debate "reflects the conviction that the best way to find the truth is to go 
looking for it in the marketplace of ideas." 1 7 6 Disagreement opens up the marketplace of 
ideas by allowing each individual justice the opportunity to present a different set of 
reasons. The strongest, most compelling, persuasive arguments will rule the day, while 
the others fade away or become minority opinions. Strong debate serves to improve the 
majority opinion because "truth, we believe, best emerges from the fires of 
Douglas O. Williams, America Challenged. Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1960), 405. 
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controversy." "The precious right to dissent.. .when exercised, brings into sharper 
focus the area or nature of the differences between the decision of the Court and the 
views of those judges who are in disagreement. The result would be a more orderly 
process of growth." Judges no longer question the existence of more than one "right" 
answer regarding a single question of law; however, fierce debate assists in discovering 
the "best" acceptable choice. "The livelier the discourse, the more open and genuinely 
collegial the exchange and opposition of ideas among the members of the court, the better 
reasoned the court's decision is likely to be." Not only does debate open up the 
"marketplace of ideas", it tests those ideas for weakness and defects, because "our 
argument is only as good as our ability to refute the opposing s ide." 1 8 0 A weak argument 
will fall apart under such rigorous debate and scrutiny. 
ii) Brooding Spirit 
Supreme Court justices are charged with the difficult task of determining the 
supreme law of the land. As the court of last resort, it is imperative that judges get it 
right, or as close to right as possible. However, to assume that mistakes are never made 
• 181 
would be assuming far too much; "Great cases like hard cases make bad law." 1 0 1 The 
Supreme Court is faced with many great cases and may make wrong decisions. Solace 
can be found in a well-written, powerful dissent. "When history demonstrates that one of 
the Court's decisions has been a truly horrendous mistake, it is comforting and conducive 
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of respect for the Court - to look back and realize that at least some of the Justices saw 
the danger clearly, and gave voice, often eloquent voice to their concern." 1 8 2 Justice 
Brennan argues that the "most enduring dissents. ..are the ones in which the author 
speaks...as "Prophets with Honor." These dissents offer guidance and "seek to sow 
seeds for future harvest" and "soar with passion and ring with rhetoric." 1 8 4 Almost like 
poetry, a minority opinion written at the right time and with the right words can become 
timeless in it effect. "There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind..." wrote 
1 o r 
Justice Harlan in his dissent from Plessy v Ferguson. "Justice Harlan stood alone in 
this dissent, criticizing the majority and the use of precedent" in his rejection of the 
Court's decision on civil rights and the rights of colored people. He spoke to the very 
core of the civil rights movement, echoing the injustice of the colored people at the time. 
Harlan's dissent eventually overshadowed the majority opinion, but at the time offered 
the only consolation to a race of people who were unfairly discriminated against. "A 
dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the 
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into 
which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed." This is the ideal 
function of a minority opinion, and unfortunately one that we rarely get to see; a dissent 
so powerful it speaks to future generations offers hope to the citizenry and ultimately 
succeeds in helping to change the law. 
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iii. Law Development 
"The hope of every dissenting judge is that today's dissent will become 
tomorrow's majority opinion." 1 8 7 In this way, separate opinions are intended to plead 
with the public, not just on behalf of the minority justice who wants to disassociate 
himself from a bad majority opinion, and to initiate social change. "(D)issenting opinions 
may be viewed both as innovative yet, paradoxically, potentially stabilizing forces in the 
law, particularly when these opinions are oriented toward the future and invite dialogue 
with those who are unsatisfied with, or feel excluded by, the majority decision." 1 8 8 
Although it rarely happens at the Supreme Court level, minority opinions can influence 
1 RQ 
future law by a reversal of precedent. The minority opinions in Dred Scott and 
Plessy190 offer examples of dissents which were relevant long after they were delivered 
because they spoke not only to their peers, but to society, and, more importantly across 
time to later generations and were in a sense, "secular prophets." 1 9 1 The intent is to write 
a separate opinion that may eventually become the majority opinion. "Dissenting 
opinions have the potential, therefore, to lay the foundations for future decisions, to be 
gradually constructed by the people who are interested in developing new approaches to 
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existing law." Reality is somewhat more pragmatic with "even the most ardent 
defender of dissenting opinions... compelled to admit that in most cases, it is the majority 
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opinion which blazes the law's trail." Minority opinions can offer hope of new 
precedent but incremental change is usually the best that can be hoped for. 
iv) Reassures the Losing Party 
Although a small token, a minority opinion can offer the losing party the 
reassurance that their side was heard and understood. A well-written separate opinion 
sheds light on the other side of the argument, while offering alternative viewpoints. 
"(T)he publication of a dissenting opinion is, among other things, some assurance to the 
litigants in the case, their counsel, and the bar and the public generally that the decision 
has been reached after careful consideration and that the deciding process has not become 
perfunctory." 1 9 4 It can be comforting to the losing side that all was not lost, and that their 
position was documented. "The publication of a dissent might be a safety valve for the 
dissenter and more importantly for the losing party and a way of mollifying the lower 
court thus reinforcing the collegiality of the bench. On the other hand, depending on the 
mind-set of the losing party, the knowledge that the court was divided might make 
matters worse." 1 9 5 The topic at hand, the salience of the issue and the timing are all 
factors that would dictate whether a minority finish was acceptable to the losing party. A 
move up from a dissent to a separate concurrence on certain controversial issues, such as 
abortion or equality rights, could be construed as a victory, not a loss. Just by having the 
losing party's concerns recognized is enough to send a signal that the members of the 
Court are divided on certain issues and that the potential for a future precedent change 
may exist. 
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v) Signaling 
The primary way courts communicate with the public is through the written 
decision. Judges rarely discuss publicly what goes on behind closed doors and are 
reluctant to address judicial relationships on the bench. A judicial decision not only 
relates to lower courts, the legal profession, government and the general public the 
outcome and subsequent legal consequences of their decision, but it also informs the 
public, lower courts and government agencies as to where the Court sits on certain issues. 
Court watchers can track the direction of the Supreme Court based on past decisions, 
voting patterns and minority opinions. Separate decisions can establish guideposts and 
inform future court users of where the Court stands regarding issues of law; ".. .the last 
external effect of a dissenting opinion, which is to inform the public in general, and the 
Bar in particular, about the state of the Court's collective mind." 1 9 6 Justice Cartwright's 
dissent in Robertson and Rosetanni v R,197 sent a signal to society, questioning the 
mentality of the majority regarding the use of the Bill of Rights and invited similar issues 
to be brought before the Court. Minority opinions can signal to the public that the Court 
may waver on past precedent and move in a new direction. Signaling is a crucial step in 
garnering the necessary support for preparing the social environment for change as 
minority opinions help to make the transition smoother. 
Signaling sends cues to society regarding the Court's willingness to hear cases 
dealing with specific issues and "provide a talisman of where the Court is heading from 
where both the bench and bar can take their bearings in subsequent cases ." 1 9 8 Due to the 
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lengthy and often expensive cost of using the justice system, it can be strategically 
beneficial to know the Court's leanings ahead of time. The cues implied through the 
written decisions of the Court encourage particular issues to come to the forefront by 
including "a variety of messages to potential litigants regarding the types of arguments to 
which they are sympathetic." 1 9 9 As the Court agrees to hear more cases on a particular 
issue, that encourages likeminded litigants to bring similar cases before the judiciary. 
"Court opinions inevitably contain some ambiguity and separate opinions provide 
individual justices the opportunity to shape the public's understanding of a majority 
opinion. For example, they send signals to lower court judges, administrative agencies 
and the broader legal community about the tentative nature of the Court opinion, and in 
so doing may affect how implementers react to i t ." 2 0 0 
Voting patterns offer cues as to the position of the Court. As the voting splits 
lessen, a message is sent announcing the Courts willingness to reconsider precedent with 
the potential for adjustment, pending the advent of the appropriate case. If the Court is 
prepared to tackle a contentious issue, the proper litigants, asking the desired legal 
question, must find its way before the Supreme Court before the Court can proceed. The 
Court cannot solicit the issues it wants to address, but can only choose from the cases 
already before it. 
vi) Accountability 
The judicial system is designed to ensure that the institution is an independent and 
impartial tribunal. Judges are afforded a significant level of autonomy to guarantee that 
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they remain unbiased, impartial third party, free from outside influences and the politics 
of the day. With so few constraints placed upon the actions of judges, the practice of 
disagreement acts as a check and balance on the majority opinion. Panel decision making 
and the interdependent, collegial nature of the bench requires a majority vote to 
successfully render a decision. Disagreement works to achieve majority accountability 
by pointing out careless flaws in the majority opinion. The threat of disagreement and a 
desire to maintain unanimity may compel a majority author to improve his opinion before 
it becomes public. In this way, disagreement or the threat of disagreement has 
strengthened the decision making process by holding the majority responsible for the end 
product. 
vii) Changing Societal Norms 
Signaling is linked with changing societal norms. The Court must be sensitive to 
societal values and its decisions must not only reflect the intentions of law, but also the 
social environment in which the laws exist. With the introduction of the Charter and the 
subsequent democratization of the courts, it is not surprising that interest and minority 
groups find the judicial system a more successful means of reform than the legislative 
route. The judiciary has become more sympathetic to minority concerns resulting in 
judicial democratization. Through an influx of "financing, organizational support and 
willing and able lawyers..." which were either "legislatively created or reflected a 
democratization and diversification of the legal profession and the interest-group system" 
the court system opened up to minority groups. 2 0 1 Mandated with the protection of civil 
liberties, the Court is prudent to be socially sensitive to the changing environment. 
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Brown v Board of Education exemplified the need for the bench to be consciously aware 
of the social implications that racial equality and desegregation presented, though society 
was not fully prepared for the consequences of such a decision. In the end, deciding to 
desegregate and actually implementing desegregation were two very different challenges. 
Although parts of society were ready to attempt desegregation, some states were 
vehemently opposed, thus producing a conflict in which President Eisenhower was forced 
to call in federal troops to enforce a desegregation order. 2 0 2 It would take years for 
society to catch up to the socially progressive nature of the Brown decision. This 
demonstrates the need for Supreme Court decisions to be compatible with the social 
order; otherwise those decisions may fall to the wayside. 
Does the Supreme Court dictate the direction society is heading with respect to 
controversial social issues or does society influence the direction the Court must take in 
its decisions? It is a precarious position for the judiciary to be in when dealing with 
complex social issues that will lead to major reform in existing legislation as the Court's 
legitimacy requires public confidence in its ability to properly determine the law. 
However, when the law is forced to evolve with the shifting times, "that constitutional 
norms and values are culturally and socially contingent..." the Court must change with 
it. Some critics argue that it is not the judiciary's place to reflect social evolution. The 
judiciary must stay within the confines of the constitution and not transgress borders of 
legislatures. The flip side argues that the constitution was not meant to be a stagnant 
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document, but instead a "living tree", capable of growth and adaptation. It is this 
creative approach that has been embraced by judges. As for the question of who's 
influencing whom, society must first open up the discussion before the Courts can 
address social reform "when judges do not agree, it is a sign that they are dealing with 
problems on which society itself is divided." 2 0 5 As Charles Epp discusses in his book, 
The Rights Revolution, the Court is a reflection of where society is prepared to go 
because the 'support structure' has paved the way. Society may need a transition period 
to get used to the idea of social reform but the infrastructure for judicial initiative should 
already be well in place before the Court can deal with such issues. 
With prestige to persuade, but not physical power to enforce, with a will for self-
preservation and the knowledge that they are not 'a bevy of Platonic Guardians,' 
the Justices generally follow; they do not lead, changes taking place elsewhere in 
society. But without taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too 
forceful to contain, the Court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or 
signal a green light for a social change. 
Conclusion: 
It seems only appropriate to conclude this chapter with a warning. Disagreement 
is a powerful and effective tool in the decision making process. As disagreement rates 
soar, judges must use restraint when disagreeing so as not to jeopardize the integrity of 
the process. US Supreme Court Justice Antonio Scalia offers his viewpoint on 
disagreement, "I do not refer to and I don not approve of, separate concurrences that are 
written only to say the same thing better than the Court has done, or, worse still, to 
display the intensity of the concurring judge's feeling on the issue before the court. I 
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regard such separate opinions as an abuse..." Unjustified or useless disagreement does 
nothing but diminish the quality of minority opinions thus decreasing its effective 
functioning on the collegial Court. The American Bar Association Proposed Canons of 
Judicial Ethics, No. 19 advises: 
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort should use 
effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the consequent 
influence of judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride of opinion or 
value more highly his individual reputation than that of the court to which he 
should be loyal. Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on 
fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of last 
resort. 
This is a strong statement regarding where disagreement fits into judicial decision 
making. The benefits of disagreement secures its place within the process; however, 
judges should be more selective in their frequency and use of disagreement to ensure it 
maintains its effectiveness. "The most effective dissent... stands on its own legal footing, 
it spells out differences without jeopardizing collegiality or public respect for and 
9 0 S 
confidence in the judiciary." There should be a time and place for disagreement and 
judges should be cognizant of when and why they chose to disagree. With very few 
checks and balances, judges must regulate themselves, choosing to disagree only when 
necessary and for good reason. Justice Holmes initially noted his reluctance to dissent 
"when it does not seem that an important principle is involved or that there is some public 
advantage to be gained from a statement of the other side." 2 0 9 
Another prominent US Supreme Court Chief Justice, Charles Hughes once said, 
There are some who think it desirable that dissents should not be disclosed as they 
detract from the force of the judgment. Undoubtedly, they do. When unanimity 
can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it strongly commends the decision 
Scalia, Antonin, "The Dissenting Opinion" Journal of Supreme Court History, (1994), 33 
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to public confidence. But unanimity, which is merely formal, which is recorded 
at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not desirable in a court of last 
resort; whatever may be the effect upon public opinion at the time. This is so 
because what must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the 
character and independence of the judges. They are not there simply to decide 
cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may 
be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence 
should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity should be secured 
through its sacrifice." 
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Chapter IV 
Research Analysis 
My research questions some basic assumptions and deep-seeded beliefs about 
disagreement behaviour on national high courts. It is no longer adequate to sort judicial 
disagreement into two simple categories, the dissent and separate concurrence, although 
this division was a good starting point at one time. Final outcome used to represent the 
distinguishing feature that defined disagreement behaviour through an identifiable 
difference. This simple categorization is no longer sufficient, as it does not account for 
the multiple and diverse variations that exist injudicial disagreement, nor does it take 
into account the similarities between dissent and separate concurrence. The separation 
between dissent and separate concurrence allowed a ranking to occur, which incorrectly 
placed the concurrence behind the dissent in value and importance. "Concurrence still 
retains something of a taint to it - that it is somehow more destructive of judicial or 
judicial institutional integrity, more invidious with respect to legal clarity, less 
9 1 0 
cooperative and more persnickety than dissent." This ranking transpired because it 
was assumed that a majority of dissents represented the ideal canonical disagreement and 
the concurrence represented only a slight differing of opinions, but my research indicates 
otherwise. The distinction between the dissent and concurrence is becoming blurred as 
there is a multiplicity of disagreement on the Supreme Court. Not all dissents represent 
the ideal form of disagreement and not all separate concurrences are minor; some dissents 
are more persuasive than some separate concurrences and some separate concurrences are 
more persuasive than some dissents. What is important is the recognition of a growing 
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spectrum of disagreement. The modem Supreme Court has evolved and disagreement 
behaviour adapted right alongside this evolution, forcing us to reconsider what it is we 
thought we knew about minority opinions. Minority opinions are not to be 
underestimated or disregarded based on their outcome, nor can it be taken for granted that 
all minority opinions look the same, because they do not. The study of disagreement 
behaviour uncovers the very diverse world of judicial adjudication, exposing the 
individual personalities and tendencies on the bench, reinforcing the collegial court as a 
strategic game, establishing the separate concurrence as a persuasive form of judicial 
expression, and illustrating the importance of minority opinion writing in an institution 
with increasing political and social influence. 
Currently, a single comprehensive approach for the explanation of judicial 
decision making does not exist. Despite political scientist best efforts "it is exceedingly 
difficult to capture the richness and complexity of justices' responses to majority opinion 
authors in any single model." There are numerous factors that influence the 
adjudicatory process, which consequently affect the final judgment. The attitudes and 
ideological preferences of judges is one element, the institutional constraints are another 
as well as the everyday interaction between judges on the collegial court which must be 
taken into consideration. It is impossible to determine the exact influences on judicial 
decision making as it is unlikely we will ever be able to accurately measure the factors 
that come into play. Speculation through an analysis of the written reasons is the best 
tool available to garner a deeper understanding of how law is crafted on the Supreme 
Court. What can be gleaned from the conventions of disagreement, the categorical 
211 Maltzman, Forrest, James F. Spriggs II and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The 
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information and the subtleties of the minority's written text will aide in the endeavor to 
explain the decision making process and arrive at a more complete understanding of 
disagreement behaviour. "Dissenting opinions - and the judicial disagreement over the 
meaning of the law that they register - are not only an important facet of common law-
legal systems, they are also fully understandable and, therefore, explainable, in terms of 
9 1 9 
the legal factors identified by a legal model of judicial decision making." 
Scholars have tried to explain judicial decision making by several different 
approaches, the most effective examples being the attitudinal, institutional and the 
strategic model. It is only recently that scholars have attempted to use the study of 
minority opinions to explain how and why judges decide the way they do and what 
influences help shape the Court's final outcome. Scholars Nancy Maveety, and Charles 
Turner and Lori Beth Way have used the special concurrence to explain judicial decision 
making behaviour on the US Supreme Court. They chose to focus on the concurrence 
"because there has been less invested in their explanation, concurring opinions and their 
issuance make for a good testing ground for the development of a unified model of 
judicial decision making." 2 1 3 This is both exciting and discouraging. As an entirely new 
approach to studying the Courts, there was little literature on disagreement behaviour to 
assist me in my pursuit of knowledge or to even provide a basic background for my 
research. However, the lack of available research enabled me to develop and refine my 
categories from scratch with the ability to adapt as the research dictated without forcing 
me to conform to a pre-existing framework. The results, although rudimentary in nature 
will lay the foundation for possible future research in this area. 
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The approach taken by Turner and Way is very similar to my own in that it 
attempts to use the separate concurrence as "a step towards explaining the relationship 
between concurrences and majority Court opinions." 2 1 4 One major difference being that I 
have chosen to analyze both types of disagreement, dissent and separate concurrence, but 
the underlying premise is the same. On today's modern Supreme Court, the voting 
patterns are no longer a satisfactory means of determining the nature of court decision 
making; "it is only with reference to the goals and motivations of the justices, not just 
their votes, that we can explore some of the characteristics of the Court as an institution 
and its relationship to larger political structures." The increasing influence court 
decisions have on political policy has made the Court's relationship with the greater 
political community more salient than ever before. Judges are not viewed as separate 
from the political action but instead, are considered active members in the political game. 
Turner and Way, as well as Maveety have realized that the study of minority opinion "at 
the individual level is critical for understanding the dynamics of judicial decision 
71 fi 7 1 7 
making" and aspire to develop a "unified model of judicial decision making" which 
has not yet been achieved. 
Turner and Way have developed four categories to "begin to account for the 
content of concurrences" and to "reveal patterns in concurring behavior by classifying the 
content of these opinions according to the four broad categories": Groundlaying, 
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Signaling, Weakening, and Preserving. Their reasons for studying the concurrence are 
twofold. They wish to emphasize the neglect that the concurrence has faced in the 
shadow of the dissent as a viable means of studying opinion writing and secondly, the 
"concurrence may be full of political and legal implications.. .that detail serious doctrinal 
differences with the majority opinion or serve other, perhaps political purposes." 2 1 9 As 
the closest and only comparison to my own research, I think it useful to highlight Turner 
and Way's categories and basic arguments. 
Groundlaying describes the concurrence that establishes an alternative test or 
interpretation for possible future use. This type of concurrence is characterized when an 
"author declares an interpretive difference with the majority opinion and often presents 
9 9 0 
an alternative strategy for deciding such cases." A concurrence that falls under the 
Signaling category would send a message to other political institutions or interested 
parties as to how a justice might decide on a potential issue. "Signaling occurs when the 
author goes beyond merely stating a difference of opinion and discusses directly the 
9 9 1 
points of law that he or she would like to revisit in a future case." When a concurrence 
wants to "narrow the scope and authority of the majority opinion by indicating that they 
do not agree with particular parts of the majority's reasoning or with any of the Court's 
opinion," 2 2 2 this is categorized as Weakening. The final category is termed Preserving 
and is a residual category of all concurrences that do not meet the requirements of the 
other three codes. A Preserving concurrence could simply provide a descriptive history, 
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a "just noting" for the record or even act as a warning to the other Court judges. It is also 
noted by Turner and Way that the tone of concurrences in the Preserving category could 
"range from mundane reflection to pithy annoyance with other members of the Court to 
full blown jeremiad warning the reader of the dangers of another party's 
interpretation." 2 2 3 I find the inclusion of tone to be pertinent because it can denote 
personality conflicts between justices. 
The significance of the Turner and Way categories are how they parallel the 
typology created for my research. Although not identical, there are some similarities 
between categories; for instance, Weakening resembles Just One More Thing and Just 
One Less Thing. Groundlaying is very similar to a Responsive and / Concur but for 
Different Reasons and Preserving is comparable to the Perfunctory section, including 
Observation. The significance of these similarities is the credibility it lends to my 
categories as a viable measure of disagreement behaviour; what can be seen on the 
Canadian Supreme Court can also be seen on the US Supreme Court. The frequencies for 
Turner and Way's opinion characteristics show Preserving at 43.1%, Groundlaying 
32.9%, Weakening 30.3% and Signaling 20.3%. 
Nancy Maveety in her essay, Concurrence and the Study of Judicial Behavior, 
contributes to the study of disagreement behaviour by examining "how concurring 
opinion-writing has been explained by the dominant models of the study of judicial 
behaviour." 2 2 4 She explains the dominant models of decision making through the analysis 
of separate concurrences and then attempts to use the separate concurrence to show the 
evolution of the decision making approaches. Maveety's assessment includes "how the 
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increased incidence of concurrence on the contemporary court has affected (1) the 
construction and evolution of these models and (2) the discussion within the law and 
courts field as to the generation of a unified model of judicial decision making." 2 2 5 
Maveety's focus on separate opinions results from a desire to change the stereotype 
associated with minority opinions as the "step-siblings of real influence: authoring (or 
shaping) majority opinions." She argues that the "reason concurring opinion writing 
has not been fully explained, even by models and research designs that focus on 
explaining the politics of opinion writing, is that judicial scholarship has heretofore 
limited itself to viewing the phenomenon in terms of extant theories of judicial 
behavior." 2 2 7 
I concur with Maveety's assessment that minority opinions have largely been 
ignored as a means of explaining opinion writing on the bench. My research will not 
only show the equal importance between the dissent and concurrence, but it also uses the 
minority opinion to explain the decision making process. Through a systematic reading 
of almost 800 minority decisions between the years 1973, when Bora Laskin was 
appointed Chief Justice, through the Charter years and ending in 1990 with the 
retirement of Chief Justice Brian Dickson, a record of disagreement was documented 
through the critical years just before and just after the Charter. 
Prior to the chief justiceship of Bora Laskin, the study of disagreement behaviour 
is somewhat irrelevant and inconsequential. The Laskin years would witness the 
beginning of the judicialization of politics and increasing judicial activism, which would 
contribute to the Court's growing visibility with the public, reaching a new crossroads 
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manifested on the Dickson Court after the Charter. As Laskin would never have the 
opportunity to decide a Charter case, it would be the Dickson Court that would aide and 
contribute to the massive transformation provoked by the Charter, with all areas of 
government, the judiciary and society experiencing the after effects. The Charter 
presented the Court new questions that did not have prior existing legal precedent. 
Designed to be interpreted by judges , the Charter solidified judicial jurisdiction over 
constitutional protection. With increasing power and greater visibility the Court was 
challenging old perceptions and fighting new criticisms while trying to balance a growing 
workload. Disagreement behaviour took on an entirely new significance, exposing the 
uncertainty of the law and the "creative" ability of the Court to read into constitutional 
text new meaning that possessed considerable ramifications for all areas of political life. 
Methodology: 
My research looks at the first two chief justiceships of the modern Supreme 
Court, identified simply as the Laskin and the Dickson Court. The Laskin Court 
represents the emergence of the modern Supreme Court in Canada and the first time 
disagreement became a pertinent topic of study. The practice of disagreement before this 
period is irrelevant due to the formalist nature of the Court decision making. The 
elevation of Brian Dickson to Chief Justice in 1984 coincided with the entrenchment of 
the Charter, making the Dickson Court crucial to evaluating the Charter impact on 
adjudication, which ultimately changed the nature of disagreement behaviour. Dickson 
passed the torch to Antonio Lamer in 1990, signaling the end of the first six years of 
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Charter decision making. The seventeen year period between Laskin's elevation to Chief 
Justice and Dickson's retirement saw almost 1800 decisions passed down by the Court 
with 775 separate minority opinions written, 439 dissents and 336 separate concurrences 
(see Table 1). 
Type of Decision - Breakdown by Court 
Table 1 
Type of Decision Laskin Court (1973-1984) 
Dickson Court 
(1984-1990) 
Dissent 268 (66%) 171 (46%) 
Separate Concurrence 139(34%) 197 (54%) 
Total 407 (100%) 368 (100%) 
A systematic reading of each separate opinion was conducted, with all dissents and 
separate concurrences read in chronological order by Court and judge, starting with 
Justice Beetz and moving through in alphabetical order. This method enabled a rapport to 
develop with each individual justice, allowing personalities to grow throughout their 
tenure on the bench; patterns emerged, personal tone and writing styles surfaced 
revealing subtle nuances unique to each justice. Through a sequential reading of each 
justice, it became easier to identify changes in attitudes, distinct styles and routines and 
recognize inconsistencies otherwise undetectable from a single case reading. Each 
separate opinion was analyzed and broken down into its basic components using a 
checklist of points. Individual items on the checklist would assist in classifying each 
decision into one of twenty-four categories; twelve dissent categories and twelve separate 
concurrence categories, which were later consolidated into five main headings. The 
checklist includes panel size, listing of the majority coalition, all minority groups, the 
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majority author, all minority authored, type of minority opinion, length, 
acknowledgment, position, background information, description/categorization, 
tone/style and any use of respect terms. 
Majority/Minority Identification: 
All members of the panel were coded based on their position in relation to the 
majority and the majority author. If Justice X signed onto the majority, it was coded as 
such, with the majority writer being coded as authoring the majority decision. As there 
were sometimes more than one minority opinion present, it was necessary to distinguish 
the minority author being studied at that particular point from any secondary minority 
opinions. Therefore, Justice Y and Justice Z were both minority authors, but I was 
reading all Justice Y's separate opinions, so Justice Y would be coded as "primary" 
minority author and Justice Z would be coded as "secondary" minority author. Any 
justices that signed onto, but did not write a decision was coded as either "signed onto 
majority", "signed onto prime minority" or "signed onto secondary/third/fourth minority" 
so all justices could be accounted for. This distinction is critical in determining coalitions 
and alliances later on, as well as supplying an average number of justices who joined 
each individual judge's minority position. 
Type of Minority Opinion/Length/Panel Size: 
Type of minority distinguishes the decision as a dissent or a separate concurrence, 
length records the number of pages of the minority opinion and indicates whether or not 
the minority in question is longer than the majority, panel size indicates how many judges 
sat on the case as well as how many participated in the vote/final judgment. Due to the 
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lengthy adjudicatory process, some justices present for the hearing were not present for 
final judgment usually because of sickness or death. 
Acknowledgement (Ack.): 
An acknowledgement usually comes at the beginning of an opinion, but on the 
odd occasion has been placed either in the middle or at the end, and is intended to 
recognize the majority author or any minority authors for their contribution. The 
standard format looks like this, "I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of my 
colleague, Justice X. . . " or "I have had the advantage of reading the reasons prepared for 
judgment by Justice Y..." but can be a variation on this theme. An acknowledgement is 
intended as a common courtesy extended to one's colleagues out of respect, very much 
like a greeting or hello. 
Position: 
The minority author may position himself with respect to the majority, which 
might entail a brief description of the issues he agrees with, disagrees with or intends to 
address in the body of his opinion. The standard positioning usually follows the 
acknowledgement and basic format looks like, "It is with respect that I must disagree 
with Justice X", or "Unfortunately, I cannot agree with issue y." Some authors choose to 
be very detailed in their positioning, "Like my brother Justice X, I would dismiss the 
appeal but I have reached this conclusion by another route." There are numerous 
variations, but all positioning places the minority author's opinion in relation to the 
majority decision. 
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Background Information: 
The detail a minority justice chooses to go into depends on the type of opinion she 
writes. It is usually the case that the majority opinion will include all facts, background 
information regarding the case and any relevant legislation offering a complete package. 
In some instances, the minority author will also include all or parts of the background 
information or may choose instead to credit the majority with this information; "My 
colleague Justice X has given the facts so there is no need to repeat them here." It may 
also be the case that no reference to the background information is provided, but instead 
the minority author has opted to skip it entirely and jump right into the issues of the case. 
The standard format for a minority opinion that includes an introduction would 
start off with a brief introduction that would include an acknowledgment, a position and a 
summary of the background information, or any combination of the three. It is common 
for an acknowledgement and a position to appear together (see Table 3.1 and 3.2), 
occurring on the Laskin Court as a team 77% (106/138) an Ack. was present and 60.5% 
(106/175) a Position was recorded. The relationship between the Ack. and the Position 
was more irregular on the Dickson Court with a significantly higher rate, 93% for Ack. 
and modest rate of 63% for the Position. It is odd that an Ack. would appear with a 
Position 30% more often than a Position would appear with an Ack.. 
Laskin Court: Frequency of Acknowledgement and Position 
Table 2.1 
No Acknowledgement Yes Acknowledgement Total 
No Position 200 32 232 
Yes Position 69 106 175 
Total 269 138 407 
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Dickson Court: Frequency of Acknowledgement and Position 
Table 2.2 
No Acknowledgement Yes Acknowledgement Total 
No Position 104 12 116 
Yes Position 94 158 252 
Total 198 170 368 
The presence of background information is not contingent upon the presence of 
the acknowledgment or position, but is more an indicator of the category within which it 
is placed. However, the background information, if present (see Table 2.3), usually 
appears in the introduction or beginning of the opinion. The higher presence of 
background information in minority opinions on the Laskin Court is consistent with the 
higher rate of Decision in Waiting during this period. A major requirement of the 
Decision in Waiting is the presence of background information and therefore it makes 
sense that the Laskin Court with 25.2% more Decision in Waiting than the Dickson 
Court, also had 26% more Background information (Table 4). The Dickson Court saw 
significantly less Decision in Waiting opinions resulting in a lower presence of 
background information. 2 2 9 
Background Frequency by Court 
Table 2.3 
Laskin Dickson 
No Background 51% (209/407) 77% (282/368) 
Yes Background 49% (198/407) 2 3 % (86/368) 
2 2 9
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Description/Categorization: 
The description of the case is determined by the presence or absence of the above 
elements, as well as my impression of the reading. Once a decision has been read and the 
checklist complete, the minority opinion is placed within one of the categories, which 
will be described in the next section. 
Tone/Style and Respect Terms: 
This is a highly subjective classification as it relies on my own interpretation of 
the minority author's manner and attitude. Personalities, highlighting certain habits and 
patterns for each judge, develop from case to case, and it is through these patterns along 
with word choice that determine the author's tone. Tone can be determined through 
acknowledgement, respect terms and word use, the presence or absence of the 
conventions of disagreement and the overall positive or negative feel of the decision. 
Decisions are coded on a +5 to -5 scale, with +5 being very positive, 0 being neutral and 
-5 being very negative. The majority of cases are coded as neutral with the number of 
respect terms and conventions of disagreement contributing to a higher positive rating. 
There is a typical judicial tone that a large majority of minority opinions take based on 
the basic formalities and a pleasant manner; 66% (269/407) of the Laskin Court and 
58.4% (216/370) of the Dickson Court were coded as neutral in tone. The positive rating 
increases with the use of respect terms and conventions of disagreement. 
There is a standard way of showing deference to a current or former colleague or 
when quoting a justice from another case through the use of respect terms. Respect terms 
can be as obvious as "with the greatest respect I must disagree," as subtle as an 
acknowledgement and can include terms of endearment such as "my brother" or "my 
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colleague". Positive connotations are easily recognized, while negative undertones are 
more difficult to decipher. The use of respect terms on the Laskin Court were nominal at 
best with only 26% (106/407) of cases recorded as using respect terms and only 1.7% 
(7/407) recorded as being "very respectful". The Dickson Court was only slightly higher 
with 30.8%o (114/370) using respect terms and 4.3% (16/370) being "very respectful". 
These are deceiving numbers for a variety of reasons, first, when you consider that out of 
the 30.8% of judges who did use respect terms, on average there are only one to two 
respect terms per decision. The neutral tone is by far the most dominant attitude taken, 
with 66% (269/407) of Laskin judges and 58% (216/368) of Dickson judges expressing 
little or no emotion above the standard formalities (see Table 2.4). Second, respect terms 
are not always used to show deference but as I will explain in "Conventions of 
Disagreement" at the end of this chapter, certain tools are employed to adjust the tone of 
the author to achieve a desired effect. When used in this manner, the genuine use of a 
respect term is diminished significantly. 
Tone and Style Analysis 
Table 2.4 
Tone/Style Laskin Court Dickson Court 
Very Negative 0 0 
-4 0 3 
-3 0 5 
-2 3 6 
-1 18 13 
Neutral 269 216 
1 35 18 
2 34 38 
3 39 46 
4 9 12 
Very Positive 0 11 
Total 407 368 
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Canadian judges subtlety disagree, unlike our American counterparts. Supreme 
Court justices are prudently aware of their image that is portrayed to the outside world, 
using discreet criticisms, understated approaches and delicate word choice to create an 
impeccably diplomatic public persona. It is an arduous challenge to find an offensive 
Canadian minority opinion because overtly negative attacks on another justice do not 
happen, or at least it did not happen on the Laskin or Dickson Courts. Disagreement is 
civilized and conducted in the most amicable manner. Therefore, bearing this in mind, 
negative disagreement does not appear to be very negative at all, but instead comes 
across as rather tame. Only 5.1% of all the minority opinions on the Laskin Court and 
7.3% on the Dickson Court received a rating of -1 or under for tone. In fact, no minority 
decision on the Laskin Court received a rating lower than a -2 and nothing lower than a -
4 was recorded on the Dickson Court. Twenty six percent of cases on the Laskin Court 
and 27% on the Dickson Court that was not included in the "neutral" category fell into 
the "pleasant/less pleasant" zone. 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube provides us with an excellent example of an openly 
critical tone, with an almost lecturing attitude and confident style directed at the majority 
in TWU v. British Columbia Telephone Co.. "The majority of this Court assumed 
without deciding that the arbitrator erred in law. They answered the second question in 
the negative, and allowed the appeal. I cannot agree with the conclusions of the majority. 
Furthermore, I feel that the questions raised merit greater discussion." L'Heureux-
Dube continued on to reprimand the majority for their inability to perform their duty in 
this circumstance, "I would agree with the majority that if there is no jurisdictional error, 
we ought to defer. But contrary to the opinion of the majority, in my view, a 
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jurisdictional error exists in this case, and there is a duty to intervene." It is unusual for 
a justice to so adamantly force her opinion without employing a more cautious approach, 
but L'Heureux-Dube openly criticizes the majority choosing not to use carefully selected 
terminology to disguise her disdain. L'Heureux-Dube continues on to say "(a) non-
interventionist approach is acceptable as long as it protects the rights and interests of 
individuals, but it must not be extended to denying recourse to courts of justice on the 
sole ground that such courts are reluctant to "interfere". When an arbitrator fails to act 
within jurisdiction, the court does not have the discretion to intervene; it has a duty to 
intervene at the behest of one or another of the parties" (emphasis in original) . 2 3 2 This is 
clearly an example of what I would consider "negative" disagreement, because of the 
sharp, lecturing tone. 
Style is a reflection of a judge's own unique writing technique, whether it is 
organized and clear, detailed and thorough, short and to the point or written as if it were a 
story and is left to the discretion of the author. For instance, some judge's choose to 
inform the reader through excessive information or detail, others get right to the point and 
forgo any unnecessary information, while some are very clear and concise in their 
reasoning making it easy for the reader to follow along. A judge's personal style is 
recorded to note any decisions that stray from the usual formula, making identification of 
conflict or personality clashes more straightforward. 
Typology: 
The purpose of the written reasons is to provide the reader with the logical 
rationale used by the Supreme Court to reach a final outcome consistent with current 
231
 Ibid, 587. 
232
 Ibid, 593. 
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legislation and the Constitution. The reasons act as a guide for lower courts, other 
government agencies such as law enforcement, legislatures and Parliament in their 
application and use of the law. Written decisions provide a level of accountability for the 
untouchable judge, by requiring judges to sign their name to a physical set of reasons that 
is made available for all to read. Judges are required to provide a rational and logical set 
of reasons not only for the benefit of other judicial actors and political officers but also 
for the public because a decision rendered without reason is considered an abuse of 
judicial power. With very little to hold the judiciary accountable, the reasons become the 
only means by which we can measure judicial success or failure and ensure that the Court 
is adjudicating justly. "The practice of dissent reveals the deliberative character of the 
court's decision-making process; it shows that a judgment is issued from an 
'argumentative interchange' among the members of the court. The publication of 
disagreements among judges is particularly important in view of the fact that the actual 
deliberations of the court (judge's conferences, the exchange of draft opinions, and the 
dialogue through which judges articulate and modify their views of a case) are removed 
from the public eye." As the only outlet available to view the rationale of the Court, 
the written reasons become a valuable exercise injudicial adjudication and the means by 
which I conducted my research. 
Studying a nineteen-year period and two chief justiceships resulted in a 775 
minority opinions that needed to be read, classified and coded. Each opinion was 
analyzed and placed into one of twenty four different categories, which were then divided 
into five different main groupings; Decision in Waiting (DIW), Failed Accommodation 
Botha, Henk, "Judicial Dissent and Democratic Deliberation" SA Public Law, Vol. 15, (2000), 327. 
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(FA), Repetitive, Creative, and Perfunctory. Each category attempts to describe the 
minority author's potential purpose for writing separately. These five categories embrace 
both dissent and separate concurrence; they also show the different patterns of 
disagreement from the Laskin Court to the Dickson Court (Table 4.1 and 4.2). 
Laskin Court: Category Breakdown by Judge 
Table 3 . 1 
Judge DIW Creative FA Repetitive Perfunctory Total 
Beetz 1 2 16 0 4 23 
Chouinard 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Dickson 34 8 6 0 2 50 
Estey 10 5 6 0 0 21 
de Grandpre 18 4 8 2 3 35 
Judson 2 0 0 6 1 9 
Lamer 7 0 4 1 1 13 
Laskin 37 16 20 2 2 77 
Martland 19 8 8 5 2 42 
Mclntyre 1 0 6 0 0 7 
Pigeon 24 5 14 0 1 44 
Pratte 1 1 4 0 1 7 
Ritchie 8 11 10 4 3 36 
Spence 22 6 8 2 1 39 
Wilson 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total 184 66 112 23 22 407 
The analysis of each category shows the top five judges in each category, with any justice registering 
less than four coded minority opinions dropped from the list to ensure an undistorted presentation. 
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Dickson Court: Category Breakdown by Judge 
Table 3.2 
Judge DIW Creative FA Repetitive Perfunctory Total 
Beetz 0 3 11 1 2 17 
Chouinard 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Cory 1 5 4 0 0 10 
Dickson 11 5 7 1 0 24 
Estey 5 4 3 3 3 17 
Gonthier 0 0 2 0 0 2 
La Forest 6 11 16 4 6 43 
Lamer 7 3 17 8 3 38 
Le Dain 1 3 6 2 1 13 
L'HD 1 17 6 8 0 32 
Mclntyre 7 10 10 3 2 32 
McLachlin 6 4 3 3 1 17 
Ritchie 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Sopinka 5 10 10 9 0 34 
Stevenson 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Wilson 15 24 30 9 6 84 
Total 74 91 125 52 26 368 
Disagreement Categories by Court 
Table 4 
Category Laskin Court (407) Dickson Court (368) 
Decision in Waiting 45.2% (184) 20% (74) 
Creative 16.3% (66) 25% (91) 
Failed Accommodation 27.5% (112) 34% (125) 
Repetitive 5.6% (23) 14% (52) 
Perfunctory 5.4% (22) 7% (26) 
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Decision in Waiting (DIW): 
Although disagreement can serve many different purposes, it has already been 
established that the dominant position is that a minority judge should use restraint, 
disagreeing only when a "conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental 
principle" 2 3 5 compels him to do so. Under these circumstances, disagreement can be 
justified through use of legal precedent, logical reasoning, supported by established or 
developing legal doctrine, which is explained in the written decision and made public. 
This type of separate opinion epitomizes what ideal disagreement should reflect, by 
pleading to a judge's sense of duty to only disagree when necessary for the dignity of the 
Court. This represents the reluctant dissenter who disagrees in an attempt to appeal to the 
"brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may 
possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been 
betrayed." 2 3 6 Also termed the canonical dissent, this form of opinion describes a 
situation where "originally penned to record the losing, minority viewpoint - that since 
not only have shaken off the stigma of the losing position, but have come to command a 
constitutional stature far superior to that accorded most majority opinion in other 
cases." 2 3 7 Anita Krishnakumar in her essay, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent 
explains that original theory applies to majority decisions that "legal theorists 
increasingly have come to recognize and study the existence of a constitutional canon 
composed of highly authoritative legal texts that command special reverence in the law" 
such as Canada's R v Oakes, and the US's Marbury v Madison, and Brown v Board of 
2 3 5
 American Bar Association's Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics, No. 19. 
2 3 6
 Quoting Chief Justice Hughes, Douglas, William 0. , "The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy" Journal 
of the American Judicature Society, Vol. 32, (1948), 106. 
2 3 7
 Krishnakumar, Anita S., "On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent" Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 52, 
(2000), 781. 
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Education. Relevant for my purpose is the reverse of the canonical decision, the 
canonical dissent; examples of American canonical dissents would be the obvious dissent 
by Justice Harlan in Plessy v Ferguson239 and Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v New 
York.240 For the dissenter, to achieve canonical status is the ultimate achievement for a 
minority opinion and the ultimate goal behind a Decision in Waiting. However, this 
achievement takes years, sometimes centuries for a dissent to find its place among the 
majority. "The canonicity of a dissent is not a function of the dissent itself but of the later 
court or courts that redeem it and make it canonical." 2 4 1 Judges write DIW with the 
intention of convincing future courts to correct the error of their ways. 
Considered the most persuasive and influential category, the title Decision in 
Waiting does not adequately describe the potential significance this type of minority 
opinion can have. Written as if it were a majority opinion, it includes all elements 
necessary to properly convey the decision of the Court, including detailed facts and 
background information of the case, as well as all relevant legislation with little or no 
reference to the actual majority reasons of the Court. A DIW usually does not include any 
form of acknowledgment or positioning with regards to the majority and will not engage 
in the majority reasons specifically. A self contained DIW allows the reader to fully 
understand the position of the authoring judge, leaving little question as to his reasons for 
judgment, resulting in a persuasive, solid argument; it is simply an outcome plus reasons 
of what the court should do. The most identifiable characteristics of the DIW are the 
presence of facts, background and legislation, with no mention of the majority author or 
238
 Ibid, 781. 
2 3 9
 1 63 U.S. 537,552 (1896). 
2 4 0
 1 98 U.S. 45, 74 (1905). 
2 4 1
 Primus, Richard A., "Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent" Duke Law Journal, Vol. 48, (1998), 
247. 
108 
reasons and tends to be long in length. Another less concrete feature of the DIW is a very 
confident, almost arrogant tone; however this tone was not standard during the Laskin 
years but evolved as a result of Justice Dickson, who is the quintessential DIW writer. It 
was Justice Dickson who established the strong DIW style and set the standard by which 
all others are held. The confident tone lends to its "written as if a majority" feel as well 
as its persuasive authority. There are variations on the theme but for the most part, the 
DIW is easily identifiable. 
Laskin Court: Decision in Waiting Category 
Table 5.1 
Judge DIW Dissent DIW Separate 
Concurrence 
Total 
Dickson 50% (25/50) 18% (9) 68% (34/50) 
Spence 51% (20/39) 5% (2/39) 56% (22/39) 
Pigeon 41% (18/44) 14% (6/44) 55% (24/44) 
de Grandpre 47% (17/35) 3 % (1/35) 5 1 % (18/35) 
Laskin 45% (35/77) 3 % (2/77) 48% (37/77) 
Estey 48% (10/21) 0% 48% (10/21) 
Dickson Court: Decision in Waiting Category 
Table 5.2 
Judge DIW Dissent DIW Separate 
Concurrence 
Total 
Dickson 33% (8/24) 25% (6/24) 58% (14/24) 
McLachlin 35% (6/17) 0% 35% (6/17) 
Estey 23% (4/17) 6% (1/17) 29% (5/17) 
L'Heureux-Dube 25% (8/32) 3 % (1/32) 28% (9/32) 
Lamer 16% (6/38) 3 % (1/38) 19% (7/38) 
The DIW can be explained in two ways; the first possibility being the author 
probably had a majority at some point but during the circulation of drafts lost votes along 
the way, resulting in a minority opinion. The evidence of this option can be found not 
only in the minority opinion but also in the majority text. Clear elements of a lost 
majority would be a minority DIW that is significantly longer in length than the majority, 
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the majority author acknowledges the minority either for the contribution of facts or for 
the reasons given, and the minority in no way acknowledges the majority. In Reference 
9 4 9 
Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) Dickson provides a classic example 
of a DIW written as if it were the majority opinion. Dickson's minority opinion is an 
extensive sixty-five pages in length with all the relevant background, facts and applicable 
legislation, compared to the short two-page decision of the majority. The majority 
author, Justice Le Dain, contributes to this theory by acknowledging Dickson "for the 
background, the issues and the relevant authority and considerations in this appeal." 2 4 3 
This is just one example of a DIW that could be construed as a lost majority opinion. 
The other potential explanation for the appearance of a DIW is a decision that was 
intended by the author to speak to future generations as the ideal version of a canonical 
disagreement. This type of DIW describes a situation where the minority author feels 
very strongly about the issue at hand and considers the majority opinion to have dealt 
poorly with that issue, making it necessary, out of conscientious difference of opinion to 
disagree in a major way. Justice McLachlin's dissent in R v Keegstra244 exemplifies the 
necessary characteristics for the canonical dissent. The controversial issues are Charter 
related dealing with freedom of expression and hate propaganda against an identifiable 
group, which mark this case as one of future importance, making the decisions presented 
of the utmost importance. 
Another defining characteristic that separates the two DIW categories is the 
length. Both the majority and minority opinions are extremely long, with McLachlin's 
registering in at seventy-two pages long and the majority's a whopping eighty three 
2 4 2
 [1987] 1 S.C.R., 313. 
243
 Ibid, 390. 
2 4 4
 [1990] 3 S.C.R., 697. 
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pages, indicating that the minority did not lose the majority. A judge who had the 
majority at one point, but lost votes along the way usually sees the majority as 
significantly shorter than the minority. R v Keegstra is not such an example, but instead 
McLachlin was probably always in the minority, indicating early on in the decision 
making process her differences with the majority. McLachlin wrote her dissent with the 
hope to persuade not only her colleagues but future generations as well. The majority also 
addresses McLachlin's reasons throughout, indicating a level of respect for a different 
interpretation, which can be seen as lending credit to the possible consideration of such 
reasons in the future. It is for this reason that the Keegstra decision is considered a 
different type of DIW than the Public Service reference. 
Creative/Interpretive: 
This grouping describes minority opinions that address the flaws of the minority 
reasoning directly and supplies a new set of reasons in its place. Included in this group 
are Positive Responsive (PR), Negative Responsive (NR) and / Concur but for Different 
Reasons (ICDR). Both the PR and the NR follow the same pattern, the only difference 
being in the perceived tone of the minority author. A Responsive is an extensive track 
through all or parts of the majority reasons, with specific references to the majority 
author by an acknowledgement and positioning on the issues, with a strong responsive 
mentioning the majority author by name throughout the decision. The PR has a strong 
conversational feel and is either neutral or amicable in nature, whereas the NR is more 
confrontational and critical in tone. The tone of the opinion can be determined through 
the use of respect terms and word choice. 
I l l 
Another important category is the / Concur but for Different Reasons. These 
separate opinions are easily identified as most judges indicate this approach in the 
introduction of the concurring decision; "I agree with the majority outcome but 
unfortunately I arrived at this conclusion by a different route." Justice Le Dain, in 
Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission) v. Gagnon245 presents a 
textbook example of an ICDR introduction, "I agree with her that the appeal should be 
allowed..., but I find it necessary to state my own understanding of the issue and the 
reasons for that conclusion." Justice Sopinka also provides an excellent ICDR in Central 
Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission)246, stating "I have had the 
advantage of reading the reasons of Wilson herein.. .Although I agree with the disposition 
proposed by her, I arrive at that conclusion by a different route." The both ICDR 
examples are medium in length averaging 6.5 pages, indicating a level of detail was 
provided for the reasons given. Neither decision provided facts or background but 
instead credited the majority author with supplying the background information. This 
leaves the minority author free to get right into the reasons, which is what distinguishes 
an ICDR from a Responsive or a DIW. 
What appears to be an innocent disagreement has three very crucial implications. 
By overtly stating that more than one possible interpretation of applicable legal rules 
exists for the same case admits the law is sometimes indeterminate and uncertain. The 
practice of disagreement "undermines the belief that judges can arrive at correct answers 
7 4 7 
to legal questions simply by applying legal rules in neutral and mechanical fashion." 
Second, the Creative category reinforces the assertion that outcome is nothing and 
2 4 5
 [1988] 2. S.C.R., 29. 
2 4 6
 [1990] 2. S.C.R., 489. 
2 4 7
 Botha, Henk, "Judicial Dissent and Democratic Deliberation" SA Public Law, Vol. 15, (2000), 323. 
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reasons are everything Thirdly, the Court signals through the Creative category alerting 
lower courts, the legal community and the population at large of possible legal avenues 
the Court may take. 
It is generally accepted that the Courts are in the policy making business and 
judges no longer just find the law but can create it. However, for the sake of judicial 
legitimacy, this admission should be downplayed instead of flaunted. There are those 
who criticize the Court's increased power in politics and debate still circulates raising 
questions regarding the role of the Supreme Court in the political sphere. An ICDR 
draws attention to the uncertainty of the law and the potential manipulation of legal rules 
to further a judge's own personal policy objectives. Although a useful category in 
opening up the marketplace of ideas and exploring all options for legal interpretation, it is 
a category that must be used wisely and fully justified. 
The Creative category has a larger capacity for persuasion as it is intended to 
stress the inadequacies or faults of the majority argument, while emphasizing the 
minority author's ideal course of action. Opinions that fall into this category are written 
to persuade the reader, the author's colleagues and possibly even the lower courts that the 
majority reasoning was flawed and the minority reasoning was superior. R v 
OAS, 
Morgentaler represents an excellent example of the Creative prototype because it has 
extreme fragmentation, extensive acknowledgement of differing views by all parties 
involved and a fervent exploration of similar questions and possible interpretations of the 
same Charter sections, extending 155 pages in length. A seven judge panel heard the 
case, resulting in a 2-2-1-2 split, with the majority represented by Dickson and Lamer, 
the first separate concurrence included Beetz and Estey, followed by Wilson's solo 
2 4 8
 [1988] 1 S.C.R., 30. 
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concurrence and concluded with a dissent by Mclntyre and La Forest. All three minority 
opinions authored by Beetz, Wilson, and Mclntyre were coded as Positive Responsive. 
This is noteworthy because all three separate opinions were highly in-depth and 
influential, indicating the desire by all authors to make strong, rationally detailed 
arguments in support of their preferred line of reasoning. 2 4 9 Morgentaler showcases the 
collegial nature of the modern Supreme Court decision making, emphasizing the dialogue 
and interaction that occurs between justices leading up to the final outcome. In this case, 
no one decision is significantly more important than the others and why Dickson, with 
only one other vote, was chosen to represent the majority is speculation. Could it be 
because as Chief Justice, Dickson had seniority? Or was a vote taken and Dickson won? 
With the Supreme Court's internal proceedings well hidden, it is difficult to know the 
specifics of assignment of the majority. 
Thirdly, there is an element of signaling inherent in the Creative category; due to 
alternative possible interpretations, the Court opens up discussion and dialogue on certain 
issues, while inviting similar issues to come to the forefront. The Creative category, 
coupled with the Repetitive typology make it convenient to watch the direction of the 
Court on certain issues, as well as changes in the voting splits, indicating to the legal 
community and society at large what issues the Court is sympathetic to and why. A 
creative minority has the opportunity to lay out the requirements necessary for an 
unsuccessful appeal to become a future successful appeal. A string of Creative cases 
dealing with a similar issue is a dialogue between majority and minority, documenting 
2 4 9
 Rarely does an entire case so clearly fall into a specific category. The categories are intended for 
individual sets of reasons, but Morgentaler, as a whole is a serious dialogue between all authors. Normally 
with multiple minority reasons, one minority author is dominant followed by more minor disagreement; 
this is not the case here, instead all parties are equally serious in their disagreement. 
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the Court's position, where they will compromise and what areas at the present time 
cannot be compromised, thus making the Creative decision one to analyze for future 
revisions. 
Laskin Court: Creative Category 
Table 6.1 
Judge Creative Category 
Ritchie 31% (11/36) 
Estey 24% (5/21) 
Laskin 2 1 % (16/77) 
Dickson 16% (8/50) 
Spence 15% (6/39) 
Dickson Court: Creative Category 
Table 6.2 
Judge Creative Category 
Cory 50% (5/10) 
Mclntyre 31% (10/32) 
Sopinka 29% (10/34) 
Wilson 29% (24/84) 
L' Heureux-Dube 28% (9/32) 
The evolution of the Creative section is less drastic than the DIW type, although 
they fulfill a similar function. It also made a significant jump in frequency, moving from 
16.3% on the Laskin Court to 25% on Dickson, moving into second place behind Failed 
Accommodation. The Creative judge is one who values detail and thoroughness, using 
the minority opinion to register justified disagreement. Considering Justice Dickson, 
Laskin, Estey, Spence, and L'Heureux-Dube, all made the top five for DIW, it is safe to 
say that these justice's disagree over serious issues requiring extensive reasons, as 
opposed to minor details. 
Failed Accommodation (FA): 
It has already been established that the collegial court judge is a constrained, 
strategic policy maker; therefore, strategy plays heavily into the decision making process. 
This game playing mentality on the bench is most evident in the Failed Accommodation 
category, which includes the Mixture, Partial dissent, Concur to a concurrence, Concur 
to a dissent, Just One More Thing, and Just One Less Thing. Accommodation of 
majority and minority ideas is an essential element to either achieving or maintaining a 
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majority, or a key factor in the decision to write separately. With many minority 
decisions hanging in the balance, contingent upon the revision of a paragraph, the 
modification of a word or the narrowing of the majority scope, this section has increased 
in importance. I began my research underestimating the significance of this section, but 
further study revealed that the collegial game manifested itself through these six 
categories. 
Just One Less Thing (JOLT) and Just One More Thing (JOMT) are self-
explanatory. JOLT refers to a judge's desire not to comment on an issue the majority 
author felt necessary, usually presenting itself in the form of "I concur with Justice X, 
except with regards to issue y, which I do not feel is necessary to address in this case" or 
some variation on that theme. JOMT is the exact opposite, describing a situation where 
the minority justice's wishes to add a comment to the judgment that the majority author 
did not: "I agree with Justice Y but would like to add one further comment." These two 
cases are the most significant examples of failed accommodation because they expressly 
state the small issue (with potential major ramifications) that the two parties could not 
agree on. Why would a minority judge choose to write separately or a majority judge 
throw away a unanimous decision if those contentious issues could have been included in 
the majority? If we had access to the private memos sent between authors, it is my 
hypothesis that the issues presented in the JOMT and the JOLT would be discussed. The 
degree of accommodation is based on the threshold of each individual justice and how far 
they are willing to compromise their opinion. The presence of a JOMT or a JOLT 
indicates the threshold has been met and compromise could not be reached. 
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Soo Mill and Lumber Co. v City of Sault Ste-Marie had Justice Pigeon separately 
concurring in 4-1 majority written by Chief Justice Laskin. Classified as a classic JOMT, 
this concurrence was only two paragraphs long but Pigeon made it very clear that the 
majority would not accommodate his reading of the issues. Pigeon positions himself 
saying, "I would hesitate to agree with the Chief Justice's construction of..." the issue at 
hand and continues to make his point, concluding with, "Subject to this observation, I 
agree with the Chief Justice." This is a cut and dry example of a majority author who 
does not feel it necessary to compromise his position either because he does not want to 
concede any portion of the reasons for the integrity of the opinion or the author does not 
have to accommodate with such a strong majority lead. 
The Mixture is a collage of ideas, which involves combining select elements from 
both the majority and another minority opinion to create another set of reasons. I call this 
the piecemeal effect because the minority justice does not add any of his own ideas to the 
reasons but instead takes bits and pieces from the other writers to create his own opinion. 
The Mixture is easily identified based on a clear statement of agreement or disagreement 
and direct reference to the issues and the authors in question. Stoffman v Vancouver 
General Hospital has Justice L'Heureux-Dube dissenting in a typical Mixture 
decision, with a continual switch back and forth between the reasons of the majority 
author, Justice La Forest, and another minority writer, Justice Wilson. Throughout the 
opinion, L'Heureux-Dube regularly positions herself with regard to the reasons she 
agrees or disagrees by stating, "I agree with Justice Wilson on her point.. ." or "I disagree 
with La Forest because...", which is a defining feature of the Mixture category. 
2 5 0
 [1974] 1 S.C.R., 78. 
2 5 1
 [1990] 3 S.C.R., 483. 
117 
Some partial dissents are recorded by the Supreme Court Reports as "Justice X, 
Dissenting in Part", which makes a Partial Dissent easy to recognize. It must be noted 
that not all "Dissenting in Part" separate opinions become classified as Partial Dissents. 
The Partial Dissent is a smaller version of the Responsive, with the minority judge 
disagreeing with only part of the majority reasons. The Partial Dissent justice does not 
provide as much detail or in-depth reasoning as the Responsive justice would, resulting in 
a much shorter decision. 
The Concur to a Dissent and Concur to a Concurrence describes a situation 
where a minority author has attached herself to another minority author, but has a few 
additional comments to include. This is also a form of failed accommodation but not in 
the conventional sense, as it is a minority writer who would not accommodate the reasons 
of another minority writer, which leads to further fragmentation of the Court. One has to 
question the validity of such unrestrained disagreement when it is encouraged to disagree 
only when absolutely necessary and these types of disagreement represent disagreement 
with disagreement. Is individual recognition the deciding factor or are the areas of 
divergence relevant enough to justify fragmentation? 
Laskin Court 
Failed Accommodation Category 
Table 7.1 
Judge Failed Accommodation 
Mclntyre 86% (6/7) 
Beetz 70% (16/23) 
Pigeon 32% (14/44) 
Lamer 3 1 % (4/13) 
Estey 29% (6/21) 
Dickson Court 
Failed Accommodation Category 
Table 7.2 
Judge Fai led Accommodation 
Beetz 65% (11/17) 
Cory 40% (4/10) 
Le Dain 46% (6/13) 
Lamer 45% (17/38) 
La Forest 37% (16/43) 
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The DIW saw a decline in use from the Laskin to the Dickson Court, and the 
Failed Accommodation typology absorbed a good portion of the slack, gaining 6.5% 
more cases, increasing from 27.5% on the Laskin Court to 34% on the Dickson Court, 
moving into first place (See Table 4). The appearance of the Failed Accommodation into 
first place suggests what Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck argue that the strategic model 
of decision making is now dominating the bench, more so than personality or institutional 
constraints, although they do factor in. What is more surprising besides the evidence to 
support the relatively new notion of the collegial court is the percentage of disagreement 
that occurs over little things. FA represents conflict over a single issue or even the use of 
certain words or phrases, areas that past judges tended to ignore to maintain consensus. 2 5 2 
Increasing FA indicates that unresolved conflict over minor details is becoming the norm, 
which may lead to a trend in careless disagreement. Not to say that all disagreement over 
minor details is careless, because that is too harsh a generalization. Often the small 
details can be extremely important when dealing with major doctrines of law; however, it 
is well established that an appellate court at the highest level should strive to achieve 
unanimity whenever necessary. The FA type is more inclined to lean in the direction of 
less serious disagreement and a clash over small areas, instead of a major "conscientious 
difference of opinion on fundamental principle." 
"Even when Brandeis failed to win concessions, however, he would refrain from publishing the dissent 
if the majority opinion, though incorrect in his judgment, was narrow and unlikely to cause real harm in 
future cases." Taken from Bader-Ginsburg, 1990 (143). This is not the only example of a Justice refusing 
to disagree when the issue at stake was of little importance, "Justice Holmes initially noted his reluctance to 
dissent 'when it does not seem that an important principle is involved or that there is some public 
advantage to be gained from a statement of the other side." Taken from Laura Krugman-Ray, 2000 (180). 
2 5 3
 American Bar Association's Proposed Canon of Judicial Ethics, No. 19. 
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Repetitive: 
This section includes the Ditto cases, which describe a minority decision where 
the disagreeing judge refers back to the reasons of another case. There were three types 
of Ditto; the first directed the reader to a previous case written by the minority author 
with no reasons attached. This type was very short in length, usually no longer than a 
paragraph, consisting of, "For the reasons I gave in...I would dismiss the appeal." and 
nothing more. The second type of Ditto is just like the first with the minority author 
directing the reader to the reasons of a previous case but some basic reasons accompany 
the decision. These decisions are usually between one to four pages in length and contain 
little detail. These two types combined comprise only 9% (2/23) of the Repetitive cases 
on the Laskin Court and a massive 81% (42/52) on the Dickson. The third Ditto type has 
the minority author referring to the reasons of a different case authored by another judge; 
"Precedent established in.. .binds me to this decision." The third type of Ditto on the 
Laskin Court made up 9 1 % (21/23) of all Repetitive cases and only 19%> (10/52) from the 
Dickson Court (see Table 8.1 and 8.2). 
Laskin Court: Repetitive Category 
Table 8.1 
Dickson Court: Repetitive Category 
Table 8.2 
judge Repetitive 
Judson 67% (6/9) 
Martland 12% (5/42) 
Ritchie 11% (4/36) 
Lamer 8% (1/13) 
Spence 5% (2/39) 
Judge Repetitive 
Sopinka 26% (9/34) 
L'Heureux-Dube 25% (8/32) 
Lamer 2 1 % (8/38) 
Estey 18% (3/17) 
Le Dain 15% (2/13) 
The Repetitive section made significant gains from the Laskin to the Dickson 
Court, jumping from 5.6% to 14% (see Table 4). This means that Supreme Court judges 
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were referring back to themselves, each other or lower court decisions 8.4% more after 
the Charter. The Dickson Court saw its judges not only use the Repetitive type more 
often, but also reference back to their own individual past decisions a majority of the 
time. This could imply that a desire by Dickson Court justices to rely more readily on 
their own decisions instead the decisions set by other national high court. 2 5 4 This shift 
could also be accounted for by the newness of the Charter document and the lack of 
established precedent, necessitating the use of domestic judgments to properly deal with 
Charter issues. Also, it could be inferred that more controversial issues introduced by the 
Charter required a longer period of time by the majority, spread out between cases to 
sufficiently address the topic. Therefore for the sake of time, minority authors found it 
convenient to use the Repetitive decision instead of repeating themselves to address the 
same concerns with the majority. 
Justice Judson from the Laskin Court offers a third, less attractive, explanation for 
the use of a Repetitive decision. Although not a frequent minority writer, Justice Judson 
managed to write Repetitive opinions 67%) (6/9) of the time during the last four years of 
his tenure on the bench. For a judge to develop such a strong pattern with only nine 
minority decisions is notable, as styles do not often appear so obviously with so few 
decisions. Coupled with the fact that Judson was reaching retirement, this particular 
pattern and type could indicate a strong apathetic attitude regarding disagreement. The 
Repetitive category can be interpreted as one of convenience as it simply points to 
reasons already delivered, requiring little or no effort on the part of the minority judge 
with caseload, time constraints, illness or laziness accounting for the use of this type of 
2 3 4
 Which is consistent with Dr. Peter McCormick's assertion in "Second Thoughts: Supreme Court 
Citation of Dissent & Separate Concurrences, 1949-1996", that following the Charter the Supreme Court 
cited itself more regularly than it did outside precedent. 
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disagreement. Due to a lack of information regarding Justice Judson's previous 
performance on the bench prior to Laskin's elevation to the position of Chief Justice, I 
would hypothesize that it was lack of effort and ease that prompted such a high 
occurrence of Repetitive opinions for Justice Judson. 
On the other hand, Justice L'Heureux-Dube uses the Repetitive type to address a 
series of cases dealing with similar issues concurrently. The Court often hears similar 
cases in groupings and decides them all at once. For instance, L'Heureux-Dube's 
• 9 5 S 
minority opinion in R v Martineau , decided on September 13, 1990 was a thirty-two 
page Creative decision. Subsequently, her next four minority decisions in R v Rodney256, 
9 5 7 9 5 8 95Q 
R v Arkell , R v Luxton , and R v Logan were handed down together and all were 
classified as Repetitive, referring back to L'Heureux-Dube's detailed and thorough 
Creative decision in Martineau. In this situation the Repetitive format was used for 
consistency as well as convenience, with the minority author fulfilling her obligation to 
provide a set of logical reasons to support her arguments. 
Perfunctory: 
Not all separate opinions are written with a discernible purpose; some minority 
opinions appear to have been written for no reason at all with the written reasons giving 
little or no evidence as to the purpose for the author writing separately. Most Perfunctory 
decisions are extremely short in length, constituting either a few sentences or a few pages 
at the most, with a lack of original arguments being presented by the minority author or 
no disagreement with majority opinion. On average, a Perfunctory type decision filled 
2 5 5
 [1990] 2 S.C.R., 633. 
2 5 6
 [1990] 2 S.C.R., 687. 
2 5 7
 [1990] 2 S.C.R., 695. 
2 5 8
 [1990] 2 S.C.R., 711. 
2 5 9
 [1990] 2 S.C.R., 731. 
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1.55 pages on the Laskin Court and 0.87 pages on the Dickson. Such a separate opinion 
may be an indication of something bigger going on that the reader is unaware of, like a 
desire for the minority author to disassociate herself from the majority for personal 
reasons. With little or no evidence present in the content of the decision, this assertion 
becomes conjecture and beyond my capabilities to infer. Justice Wilson in Calgary v 
Northern Construction Co. wrote a separate concurrence, representing herself and 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube. Both the majority, written by Justice Mclntyre for Justice 
Estey and Justice La Forest, and the minority were extremely short in length at only a few 
sentences long. Wilson, in her minority proceeded to repeat the issue of the case and 
agree with Mclntyre's use of another case as precedent as well as his outcome. No other 
reasons were given and no disagreement was registered, making it difficult to understand 
why a separate opinion was even presented. What makes this case of interest is the 
separation between two female justices from three males, which raises the question about 
gender divisions on the bench. Did gender factor into the reasons to disagree? However, 
this line of reasoning cannot be substantiated because there is no proof indicating this 
being the reason for Wilson and L'Heureux-Dube's separate position. Another 
0 £ 1 
illustration is Justice Beetz's opinion in Labrosse v R that, in its entirety, consisted of, 
"I agree with the conclusion of Mclntyre, Lamer and La Forest JJ. that the appeal should 
be dismissed." There are a few elements worth noting here; the fifth judge on the case, 
Justice Chouinard took no part in judgment, meaning that the final outcome was three 
against one. Also, the majority opinion was recorded as written by all three judges, 
instead of the usual one author for the majority. This rarity not only amplifies the 
2 6 0
 [1987] 2 S.C.R., 757. 
2 6 1
 [1987] 1 S.C.R.,310. 
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division between the majority and the minority, but it stresses the unity between the 
majority and their willingness to write as a coalition, signing all three names as the 
opinion writer. A clear pattern of disagreement does not exist between Justice Beetz and 
the majority authors that would suggest a strong personality conflict between the two 
parties, resulting in a desire by Beetz to disassociate himself from the Court. Although 
classified as a Perfunctory decision, there is more going on than meets the eye. 
Unfortunately in this case, a lack of information requires speculation and I do not posses 
the necessary details to adequately hypothesize the minority judge's intentions. 
Laskin Court: Perfunctory Category 
Table 9.1 
Dickson Court: Perfunctory Category 
Table 9.2 
Judge Perfunctory 
Beetz 17% (4/23) 
Judson 11% (1/9) 
de Grandpre 9% (3/35) 
Lamer 8% (1/13) 
Ritchie 8 % (3/36) 
Judge Perfunctory 
Estey 12% (2/17) 
La Forest 7% (3/43) 
Beetz 6% (1/17) 
Mclntyre 3 % (1/32) 
Wilson 2 % (2/84) 
Justice La Forest is the classic example of a justice who uses minority opinions to 
disassociate himself from the majority. During the years 1987 to 1989, a strong pattern 
of alienation developed in a series of solo minority opinions authored by La Forest. The 
first instance being a series of three cases, Pelech v Pelech , Richardson v 
Richardson263, and Caron v Caron,264 with all majority opinions being authored by 
Justice Wilson. All three cases were written a day apart and dealt with similar issues 
regarding spousal support after divorce, creating a link which might account for 
La Forest's consistent minority position; however, the link is not supported by the content 
2 6 2
 [1987] 1 S.C.R., 801. (La Forest concurring); written as an "In My Own Words" concurrence. 
2 6 3
 [1987] 1 S.C.R., 857. (La Forest dissenting); written as a "Negative Responsive". 
2 6 4
 [1987] 1 S.C.R., 892. (La Forest concurring); written as a "Perfunctory" concurrence. 
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of the decisions. If La Forest had been consistently in disagreement with Wilson's 
reasoning, the link could be supported, but La Forest was not. In both Pelech and Car on, 
La Forest agreed with Wilson on her "proposed disposition and reasons for judgment" 
but chose to write separately. The separate concurrence in Caron v Caron draws the 
most attention because it appears to be a separate opinion written only to be consistently 
separate. La Forest's does not disagree with the majority, and states his agreement 
accordingly, giving no reason for his separate concurrence. However, despite La Forest's 
extremely brief reasons in Caron, read in conjunction with the first two minority 
opinions, which were both negative in tone and confrontational in style, it can be inferred 
that a conflict existed between Wilson and La Forest. The reason for the conflict is 
unknowable to the reader but compelled La Forest to distance himself from Wilson to 
make a point; a point only the majority justices involved would be able to detect. La 
Forest's desire to separate himself from his colleagues was not an isolated incident, but 
became part of La Forest's earlier disagreement style with seven distinct cases where I 
noted La Forest's detachment from the majority for nominal reasons. R v Holmes and 
Maurice v Priel266 are prime examples of deliberate alienation from the majority. Both 
cases are solo separate concurrences, consisting of one or two sentences stating La 
Forest's full agreement with the reasons and outcome of the appeal with no other reasons 
for writing separately. La Forest's disassociation from the majority is not necessarily 
negative in nature or reflects his abrasive manner, but in some cases simply a way for La 
Forest to distinguish himself separately. Obviously, La Forest is a justice who does not 
8
 favour unanimity at all costs, and I speculate instead that he embraces individual 
2 6 5
 [1988] 1 S.C.R., 914. 
2 6 6
 [1989] 1 S.C.R, 1023. 
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expression when he feels it is necessary. La Forest felt that "the fact-centric nature of 
litigation and the multiplicity of principles available for resolving disputes in any given 
context, stare decisis seems to me less of a constraint on judicial lawmaking than is 
generally supposed. Certainly, in my attempts to move the law forward, I have only 
rarely found it necessary to overrule cases." This is a powerful statement regarding La 
Forest's opinion of the principle of stare decisis; La Forest does not feel strictly bound by 
it, or at least he acknowledges there is flexibility in its use. Where other justice's might 
have signed onto the majority to provide the ideal unanimous decision, in these cases La 
Forest chose instead to fragment the Court "to move the law forward" in his own 
personal way. 
Perfunctory also includes an "observation" element as some decisions are written 
with a lecturing or a "by the way" tone. Often associated with a warning as to the role of 
courts within the Canadian system or a description of how the law should fit into the 
social climate, the Observation decisions are rare. These decisions are classified as 
Perfunctory because separate opinions should be used for the benefit of the judicial 
process and not as a means of reprimand. Justice Wilson's Perfunctory decision in 
Forget v Quebec (AG), provides an example of a "by the way" quality, written only to 
inform the reader of what Wilson thinks the role of the Court could be if the 
circumstances were different surrounding the merits of the case. 
The Cryptic disagreement signifies an opinion that is indecipherable and 
confusing. There are very few cases that are described as Cryptic; it is usually a 
confusing format and lack in organization that results in a Cryptic opinion. R v 
2 6 7
 Johnson, Rebecca and John P. McEvoy, ed., Gerard La Forest at the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-
1997. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba (2000), 3-4. 
2 6 8
 [1988] 2 S.C.R., 90. 
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Nehring, is a one page decision written "by the Court" with the Court stating the 
position of the minority as. "Three members of the Court (Estey, Lamer and Wilson JJ.) 
are in substantial agreement with the minority judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal 
and would allow the appeal." No only is it impossible to determine who is writing the 
majority reasons, but the minority is not even responsible for writing the minority 
reasons. It is an odd situation that results in a pointless set of reasons. 
Justice Beetz led the Laskin Court in Perfunctory decisions and placed third on 
the Dickson Court, giving him the inauspicious title of the most perfunctory judge. 
Beetz's style and purpose was sometimes hard to decipher, making it difficult to classify 
some of his decisions. Fortunately, Perfunctory represents only a nominal portion of 
disagreement on the bench, and even though it requires analysis because it does happen, 
it is not an overly significant category. Although stating Perfunctory decisions as useless 
disagreement is a harsh criticism, these cases represent pointless dissention from the 
majority and should be discouraged. It is somewhat presumptuous of me to judge the 
rationale of a Supreme Court justice, as I am not privy to the inner workings of their legal 
mind; however, based on the available reasons presented in some Supreme Court cases, I 
am confident in my observation of perfunctory disagreement. 
Overview: 
As shown in Table 4, disagreement changed significantly between the two courts, 
with a massive shift in dominance by the DIW during the Laskin Court to a more 
balanced spread of disagreement during Dickson's tenure. The drop in the DIW is a 
significant change from first place on the Laskin Court to third place on the Dickson 
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 [1986] 2 S.C.R., 709. 
Court. The DIW category made the most drastic evolution from one court to the next. 
The DIW represented the "standard" type of disagreement during the Laskin Court, 
meaning that the minority authors tended to use the DIW as the typical format when 
disagreeing. Dissents on the Laskin Court accounted for 268 (66%) of the 407 separate 
opinions written, with 161 (60%) of those being dissent DIW, clearly showing the 
dominance of the DIW over the other forms of disagreement. The dissent DIW 
represented only 56 (33%) of the 171 dissents on the Dickson Court. An early Laskin 
DIW has all the elements necessary to fall into this category; however, the Dickson Court 
would add two more key characteristics, lengthy decisions and a confident tone. Chief 
Justice Dickson can be credited with creating the new standard for the DIW, taking it 
from its typical, casual use to the form of disagreement only utilized under strong 
conviction, which is the DIW's more ideal function. A Dickson DIW possess all the 
necessary elements of the ideal canonical minority opinion one would expect from a 
decision meant to persuade future generations and overturn precedent. The style and the 
tone became significantly more serious, compelling and persuasive which could be 
contributed to the Court dealing with more controversial issues or important questions of 
law. The increased length of a Dickson DIW is of significance as well because although 
the Laskin Court had a higher frequency of disagreement, the Dickson Court wrote longer 
decisions, almost three pages more on average (7.9 to 10.3), with considerable difference 
in length between a Laskin DIW (D=13.2 pgs, SC=14.4 pgs [13.9]) and a Dickson DIW 
(0=25.6 pgs, SC=24.2 pgs [24.9]). An eleven-page difference in length is substantial and 
a possible explanation could attribute this massive disparity to the introduction of the 
Charter. The Court's sudden thrust into unknown legal territory caused an influx of 
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serious legal questions with little or no precedent to offer guidance, resulting in a greater 
variation of disagreement and the need for more space to provide adequate reasons. 
As a result of the Charter, the Dickson Court required a modified ranking system 
of disagreement with the DIW becoming a more serious type of disagreement. By 
"serious" it is meant that the minority opinion adheres to the ideal function of 
disagreement, which is when a judge's conscience compels them to write separately and 
not for more minor reasons. The DIW represents "serious" disagreement because in 
order to fit under this heading, the decision usually contains a lengthy, well thought out, 
detailed set of reasons. The Creative disagreement category comes in a close second, 
differing from the DIW mostly in tone and style, while the Failed Accommodation and 
Repetitive categories pick up the less serious disagreement which can be defined by the 
"little things". This is not to say that minor disagreement cannot be important, but a 
separate opinion that differs from the majority reasons entirely is substantially more 
significant than one that disagrees with a word or phrase. I hesitate to compare the first 
four categories in terms of "importance", because the sections all have an important, but 
different functioning; it would be like comparing apples to oranges. However, the final 
Perfunctory category, not only comes in last as the least serious grouping, but can also be 
coined the least important as it represents relatively useless disagreement. 
The evolution of the DIW parallels the evolution of judicial decision making, with 
the Charter being the chief catalyst. With the increased acceptance of the indeterminacy 
of the law and the expectation of judges to create law from time to time, the Charter 
opened the door for disagreement to expand, with the categories supporting this claim. 
More judges were experimenting with minority opinions, and some judges took it to a 
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whole different level, carving out a new path for decision making. Laskin himself was 
responsible for making disagreement "important" and was consequently dubbed the 
"great dissenter" although Laskin's frequency of disagreement cannot match that of 
L'Heureux-Dube or Wilson. The contribution of the Laskin Court was to pave the way 
for serious disagreement and serious questioning of the majority reasoning, offering the 
alternative interpretation that Laskin was so deeply committed. The Dickson Court was 
compelled to change its decision making style as a result of the Charter. With no 
precedent to guide them and a Laskin inspired innovative decision making style, Dickson 
Court judges embraced disagreement, expanded the options of disagreement and gave it 
personality. Disagreement became more complex, with inherently deeper meaning, 
allowing judges the opportunity to fully express themselves. The strategic nature of 
disagreement manifested itself with the expansion of the Failed Accommodation 
category. Disagreement over "little things" became more readily accepted, with a change 
in attitude towards disagreement by certain judges. The Laskin Court was still a bit 
reluctant to disagree over the little things to preserve the unanimous court, reserving 
disagreement for the more important issues, hence the dominance of the DIW. The 
Dickson court used less restraint or accommodation in order to register disagreement over 
"little" issues of divergence. The Charter also raised new issues requiring careful and 
prudent consideration, and a level of "tweaking" over the years can be seen in the high 
frequency of Failed Accommodation on the Dickson Court. It would be interesting to 
know the dominant category on the Lamer Court to see where disagreement has evolved 
to next. Were the Charter tests generally established on the Dickson Court, causing 
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disagreement to change for the Lamer Court? Did disagreement remain evenly spread 
between the categories or did one type take dominance? 
Conventions of Disagreement: 
Supreme Court decision writing is distinctive to judges or members of the legal 
profession because they have to speak in a way that is both accurate to the legal code but 
ambiguous enough to fit into the "living tree" analogy of the Constitution. Like legalese, 
a judicial decision can be very difficult to read and even harder to comprehend. However, 
once the written text can be deciphered, patterns and styles emerge making it not only 
easy to follow the author's reasoning but also to pick up on certain formalities or 
unwritten rules that are consistent from writer to writer; these formalities will be referred 
to as conventions of disagreement. Conventions of disagreement are tools used to make 
disagreement more agreeable. Due to the collegial nature of decision making, it is in a 
justice's best interest not to alienate his colleagues through a harsh critique of majority 
reasoning or an aggressive tone towards the majority author. Disagreement can be a 
subversive tactical move by a minority or a subtle reprimand of the majority, all of which 
can depend on word choice, tone and style. 
There is a distinct difference between the American and Canadian systems with 
regard to conventions of disagreement. A far more vocal and overtly critical institution, 
the USSC practice of verbal abuse is legendary. Philip Cooper in his book, Battles on the 
Bench: Conflict Inside the Supreme Court, exposes some of the darker side of judicial 
relationships. Cooper quotes Justice O'Connor saying this is how the legal profession 
prefers to see justice interaction as, "every justice holds every other justice in very high 
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regard and has great respect one for the other." Truly, this statement is true more often 
than not. However, USSC justices have had some infamous public as well as private 
confrontations, which we have the pleasure of reading when private papers, memos, and 
diaries are published. 2 7 1 This sort of information is not made public in Canada, and 
although it is hard to deduce from the written reasons whether or not this kind of conflict 
arises between justices, it is safe to assume that some altercations do occur. "Internal 
disputes among the justices over professional matters are at the very core of collegial 
decision making"; perhaps, it can be inferred that Canadian judges find themselves in 
similar circumstances but they simply hide it better. Conventions of disagreement act to 
preserve the civilized nature of judicial decision making while maintaining disagreement 
between judges respectfully. 
As already established by the strategic model of opinion writing, constructing a 
majority opinion can be a complicated process. It is not just legal precedent and doctrines 
of law that come into play, although it should not be taken for granted that this is the 
leading determinant in ajudge's decision. Strategy will affect the final majority coalition 
and what a judge does today may hurt him tomorrow by creating an enemy instead of an 
ally on the bench. A minority opinion is still a criticism of the majority reasoning; some 
disagreement is small and inoffensive, while other forms of disagreement can be 
Cooper, Phillip J., Battles on the Bench: Conflict Inside the Supreme Court. Kansas: University Press 
of Kansas, (1995), 104. 
2 7 1
 One such example of a direct attack in a dissent was between Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan in 
Island Trees Bd. Of Ed. V. Pico (457 U.S. 853 (1982)). Rehnquist began "I disagree with Justice Brennan's 
opinion because it is largely hypothetical in character, failing to take account of the facts as admitted by the 
parties... and because it is analytically unsound and internally inconsistent." This type of aggressive tone is 
rarely seen on the Canadian Supreme Court. Rehnquist does not stop there but he continues saying, "When 
Justice Brennan finally does address the state of the record, he refers to snippets and excerpt of the relevant 
facts...But it is not the limitations which Justice Brennan places on the right with which I disagree; they 
simply demonstrate his discomfort with the new doctrine which he fashions out of whole cloth.. .1 find 
wholly unsupported by our past decisions..." I could continue but the point is made. Cooper, 64. 
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considerable and potentially abrasive. Conventions of disagreement can soften the blow 
of a harsh criticism by reducing the offensive undertones. 
Conventions of disagreement are tools of the judicial trade and have evolved over 
time to maintain harmonious relations on the bench. Used for a specific purpose, these 
tools act as a buffering instrument allowing a judge to disagree without being too 
offensive, derogatory or rude, unless of course it is the intention of the minority justice to 
do so. The presence or absence of conventions of disagreement set the tone for the 
separate opinion and can act as a tactical maneuver in the collegial game. 
Laskin Court: Conventions of Disagreement 
Table 10.1 
Yes No 
Acknowledgement 40% (138/407) 66% (269/407) 
Positioning 43% (175/407) 57% (232/407) 
Respect Term Use 28% (113/407) 72% (294/407) 
Dickson Court: Conventions of Disagreement 
Table 10.2 
Yes No 
Acknowledgement 46% (170/368) 54% (198/368) 
Positioning 68% (252/368) 32% (116/368) 
Respect Term Use 3 5 % (130/368) 65% (238/368) 
The Acknowledgement: 
Not only is the acknowledgement the most basic tool but as a standard part of the 
introduction, it is also the first tool you will see. The normal use of the acknowledgement 
is in the first sentence or paragraph of a separate opinion. It can also be the case, although 
rare, where the acknowledgement can come a few pages into the decision or at the end. 
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The standard form is, "I have had the advantage of reading..." or "I have had the benefit 
of reading the reasons of Justice X. . . " Occasionally a judge will make a small deviation 
from this form, but the wording is usually similar. There is the odd case where a justice 
will surprise the reader with a, "I have read with great interest the compelling reasons of 
my colleague..." or a "With much reflection and all due respect..." which indicates a 
greater amount of respect than the standard, with the author going over and above what is 
necessary. Another respectful deviation from the standard is to include the majority 
author's name using "my brother" Dickson or "my colleague" Wilson. An direct 
acknowledgement using the majority or another minority author's name can be taken 
either as a compliment or in some instances as an attack. 
The standard acknowledgement is a safe and expected way to address the 
majority, being used 40% (138/407) of the time on the Laskin Court and 46% (170/370) 
on the Dickson Court. The Dickson Court used acknowledgement 6% more than the 
Laskin Court, even with less minority opinions. Judges vary in their use of the 
acknowledgement, some being very consistent and predictable while others rarely use it. 
Justice Mclntyre acknowledged consistently more than he did not on both Courts. On the 
Dickson Court, Mclntyre acknowledged his colleagues 65.6% (21/32), with Justice 
Ritchie on the Laskin Court a close second with 6 1 % (22/36). Acknowledgement was 
part of Mclntyre's writing "formula" and was not used as a respect tool. Because of its 
overuse, the acknowledgement in this situation loses its value by desensitizing the reader 
to it. However, due to a Justice Mclntyre's indiscriminate use of acknowledgement, 
when it is absent, one has to question the author's intention. For the most part, when an 
acknowledgement was absent, a position was present indicating some recognition of the 
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majority. When both were missing, Mclntyre was usually writing a DIW, where neither 
was expected. On the few occasions where there was an absence of an 
acknowledgement, such as Re: B.C. Motor Vehicles Act, the case was classified as 
"perfunctory" and Mclntyre had a strong desire to disassociate himself from the majority, 
thereby warranting his lack of acknowledgement. An absence of acknowledgement can 
be an indication that something is going on behind the scenes that the reader is not privy 
to. Was it a deliberate omission? Was the minority writer trying to make a point? Does a 
personality conflict exist between the two authors? In the case of Justice Mclntyre, 
further readings helped answer these questions by arriving at a speculative conclusion. 
The absence of an acknowledgement where one would normally exist sends up a red flag, 
targeting that separate opinion for greater scrutiny. 
On the flip side, a judge who rarely uses acknowledgement does not send up red 
flags because that is his standard routine. On the occasion when he chooses to engage the 
acknowledgement, it is useful to pay closer attention to the details of the case. Who is 
the majority author and why did the minority writer decide to signal him out? What kind 
of category does this case fall into? Chief Justice Dickson chose not to use 
acknowledgement on a regular basis, acknowledging only 18% (9/50) on the Laskin 
Court and 33% (8/24) as Chief Justice. Justice Martland was also leery of the 
acknowledgement, using it only 2 1 % (9/42) on the Laskin Court. When he did 
acknowledge, 77.7% (7/9) were accompanied by a "my brother", which indicates a 
greater level of respect. This is consistent with my assumption that those that rarely 
acknowledge only do so when they want to show respect. The alliance between Justice 
Spence and Chief Justice Laskin is no secret. Justice Spence was a loyal ally to Laskin 
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and when Spence was not supporting Laskin with his vote, Spence was disagreeing with 
Laskin "respectfully". Seven of the 17 (41%) cases where Spence acknowledged the 
majority writer were directed at Laskin and of the 11 cases where Spence was in 
disagreement with an opinion Laskin wrote, Spence acknowledges Laskin 63.6% (7/11) 
of the time. The only judge Justice Spence was consistently "respectful" to was Chief 
Justice Laskin. 
Acknowledgement is a very common convention of disagreement because it is 
easy to use. Crediting the majority with supplying the facts or recognizing the majority 
opinion is as common as greeting someone on the street with a passing hello or starting a 
letter with "Dear Sirs". The level of respect increases with the degree of personal touches 
the minority authors adds to the mix. The acknowledgement has become standard 
practice on the modern Supreme Court and although it may seem insignificant, and surely 
cannot expose the tone of the entire opinion, it can foreshadow the tone of the minority 
author. 
The Position: 
A second basic tool of respect is the positioning of a judge and involves the 
minority judge indicating his agreement or disagreement with aspects of the majority 
opinion. A minority judge can either disagree with majority on issue z and may briefly 
explain why, or start with aspects of the majority the minority judge agrees with and then 
go into what is in dispute. Positioning usually follows the acknowledgement in the form 
of "I agree with my colleague on issue y. . ." or "I must disagree with issue z . . ." The 
acknowledgement and the position make up a significant portion of the introduction, 
giving the reader a clear and organized picture of where the minority author intends to go 
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and the issues that will be addressed in the main body of the opinion. This is a practical 
way to lead into their argument as well as clearly stating what issues are in disagreement. 
Aside from the functionality of the position, the basic format can be enhanced to heighten 
the degree of respect. "With great deference I must disagree with my brother Justice X" 
or "With the utmost respect, I regrettably must dissent from the majority..." Positioning 
allows the minority author to ease into criticism without ruffling too many feathers right 
off the start and provides an opportunity to indirectly apologize for disagreeing. 
In certain opinions, a justice will continually position himself throughout his 
minority opinion, with respect to the issues he disagrees with. This can be construed as a 
sign of respect by crediting the majority with the introduction of that particular question. 
"I agree with Justice X's disposition in this appeal..." or "The question raised by my 
colleague, Justice Y is not one that needs to be addressed." Very respectful positioning is 
accompanied by a respect term, "Regrettably, I must respectfully disagree," or "With 
respect for those who hold a different view..." 
Respect Terms: 
Respect terms are the most useful and effective convention of disagreement. 
Aside from being used to show deference for a justice held in high regard, minority 
judges use respect terms as an effective tool to soften the blow of a particularly harsh 
criticism, acknowledge the contribution of another justice or show regret for disagreeing. 
Respect terms refer to phrases such as "with great respect", "with all due respect", "with 
utmost respect for those who think differently", "I am grateful to . . . " as well as the less 
obvious, "my brother", "in my humble opinion", or "my colleague", to name a few. 
Occurring 27.7% (113/407) on the Laskin Court and 35.3% (130/368) on the Dickson 
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Court, respect terms are used sparingly. The use, frequency, and degree of respect varies 
from judge to judge, with Justice Estey respectfully disagreeing 76% (16/21) on the 
Laskin Court and 47%(8/17) on the Dickson Court and Justice Dickson displaying high 
levels of respect on the Laskin Court, 52% (26/50) and as Chief Justice 37.5% (9/24). 
Chief Justice Laskin on the other hand has very low respect rates, 2.5% (2/77) as did 
Justice Beetz, 17.3% (4/23) and 17.6% (3/17). 
The most obvious use of respect terms is to indicate high esteem for a colleague, 
either on the sitting panel or from another case. The classic example would be Chief 
Justice Dickson's deep distress with having to disagree with his friend, Justice Wilson in 
R v Gamble; "I have read the reasons of Justice Wilson but with considerable regret have 
9*79 
concluded that I cannot concur." Throughout the text, Dickson's struggle is apparent, 
"I respectfully disagree with this conclusion..." but he continues with, "I am grateful to 
Wilson for her discussion of the facts and resume of the lower court judgments and I 
adopt such discussion and resume." This example is made more effective when 
Dickson's usual character is taken into account. Although Dickson uses respect terms 
frequently, his tone is rarely reverent. Dickson's confident and arrogant tone surpasses 
Laskin with 76% (38/50) of Dickson's minority opinions being very aggressive. 
It was very clear from this opinion that Dickson holds Wilson in high regard and 
reluctantly decides to disagree with her. This is a powerful statement regarding the 
choice to disagree. The issues at stake compelled Dickson to dissent despite his 
admiration for the majority author and the possibility of insulting her by dissenting. 
Dickson also used respect terms to convey his high regard for the majority to the public 
[1988] 2 S.C.R., 595. 
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through the written reasons. I have yet to read another minority opinion that 
compliments the majority author so sincerely. 
Conventions of disagreement must be used properly to ensure their effectiveness, 
because excessive use of the tools limits their value and under use amplifies their impact. 
Each individual justice has their own tone and style which they choose to convey to the 
public. Creating a balance to maximize the potential of the respect term is a struggle. 
Justice Wilson has mastered the use of the respect term to soften her critical edges 
without compromising her opinion. A moderate user of respect, 45% (38/84) on the 
Dickson Court, Wilson's writing style was eloquent, subtle, yet strongly critical of the 
majority reasoning. Two strong examples of Wilson's appeasing style stand out in R v 
Beland213 and R v Morgentaler214, where respect terms were used to soften Wilson's 
rough edges. Both cases include an acknowledgement of all authors, both majority and 
minority, and have extensive use of "respect terms". "I must respectfully disagree..." 
Wilson starts in Beland, "In my respectful view...", "my own view would be. . ." , "With 
all due respect to those who think otherwise..." humbles Wilson's disagreement with the 
majority. In Morgentaler, Wilson also includes "I am not unmindful of the fact that..." 
and extensively uses "I would respectfully agree..." instead of focusing strictly on the 
elements of disagreement. The sensitive nature of the issues in Morgentaler required 
dealing with the topic delicately. Wilson obviously had strong opinions about the issues 
at hand, as she made publicly known, but dealt with the case in a professional and 
dignified manner, while still holding true to her principles. What is also unique to 
Wilson is her ability to successfully lecture the Court without coming across as abrasive. 
2 7 3
 [1987] 2 S.C.R., 398. 
2 7 4
 [1988] 1 S.C.R., 30. 
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In Behind, while disagreeing with the majority's decision, Wilson's skill shines through: 
"In my view, therefore, we would be making law in this area if we were to hold such a 
rule applicable in the circumstances of this case. This is not to say that we should not do 
so, but merely that, if we do so, we should do so advisedly." 2 7 5 
Respect terms can also be used sarcastically to discreetly attack the majority 
writer or in an antagonistic way by indicating a frustration with the Court. This 
unfortunately can be difficult to detect and requires familiarity with individual justices 
and their specific personalities. The tension between Justice Martland and Chief Justice 
Laskin was well known, given the circumstances surrounding Laskin's appointment to 
the chief justiceship over Martland. This resulted in a period of deep-seeded division 
between the two judges and Laskin's subsequent difficulty to hold a solid majority of the 
Court for a five-year period. Martland provides us with an excellent example of 
sarcastic respect terms, used to antagonize the majority. In Mitchell v R, Martland is a 
sole minority author among three different minority groups; one group is led by Laskin, 
the other by Spence, and the majority writer is Ritchie. In his acknowledgement, 
Martland refers to Ritchie and Spence as his "brothers", while referring to Laskin only as 
the "Chief Justice". This has two significant implications; the first being Martland's 
reluctance to refer to Laskin in a personal way and by using the rather formal title of 
Chief Justice, which is reminiscent of what could have been his, and second, the 
exclusion of Laskin from the others justices sends a rather stern message. This theme is 
carried on in Volvo Canada Ltd. V U.A. W., Local 720, where Martland again fails to refer 
to Laskin as "brother", which he does for Pigeon. Martland's flippant tone is evident 
2 7 5
 [1987] 2 S.C.R., 423 
2 7 6
 See note in Chapter 1. 
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when he says, "I would agree with the disposition of this appeal as proposed by the Chief 
Justice, but, with great respect, I am not prepared to agree with.. ."(emphasis added). One 
would automatically assume this was meant sincerely but in conjunction with the other 
elements of Martland's decision, the sarcastic tone is undeniable. 
Future Inquiry. 
Time and space constraints made it impossible to address all the aspects of my 
research that were noteworthy. I wish to briefly highlight the next step in disagreement 
research that is of great interest to me. 
Basic categorization is the first step in understanding disagreement behaviour as a 
means of explaining the decision making process. I was able to examine the first two 
Courts of the modern Supreme Court, leaving the Lamer and the McLachlin Court 
unexamined. A comprehensive examination of the Lamer and McLachlin Courts is 
necessary to provide the most up-to-date picture of judicial disagreement. The next step 
is to identify the type of law and the legal issues judges are disagreeing about. Do certain 
subjects cause more disagreement than others? Are these issues Charter related or have I 
overestimated the impact of the Charter on decision making? The content of minority 
opinions is necessary to fully comprehend disagreement behaviour and to legitimize 
some of the rudimentary claims my categories have made. 
After the issues of disagreement have been determined, I would address gender 
disagreement. Do female justices disagree over certain issues more often than male 
justices? In the last thirty years, female disagreement far surpassed male disagreement, 
warranting a closer analysis of gender decision making. During their tenure on the 
bench, the first three women judges on the Supreme Court wrote minority opinions more 
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often than all the disagreement of the male judges combined. Associated with gender 
divisions would be to assess the effects of personality conflicts on the decision making 
process. Are certain majority judges disagreed with more often than other judges and if 
so, why? Do personality conflicts cause disagreement between judges? The conventions 
of disagreement, the use of respect terms and the number of judges that sign onto a 
minority opinion, can aid in the assessment of personal relationships on the bench. 
Final Conclusion: 
"Sometimes judges disagree." 2 7 8 The level and degree of disagreement depends 
on a wide range of surrounding circumstance, influencing factors and tactical maneuvers 
which will impact the final product of the adjudicatory process. The modern collegial 
Supreme Court is no longer just about stare decisis and rule of law, but instead maintains 
a degree of creativity in its decision making that may result in multiple interpretations of 
the same legal question. This leads to disagreement not just about outcome but also the 
reasons for the outcome. Does this mean that the majority is right and the minority is 
wrong? Not necessarily. As constrained, strategic policy makers, judges wear a number 
of different hats, so the answer to this question is not as straightforward as "right" and 
"wrong". There are numerous factors that must be considered. Besides the ideological 
and personal preferences of judges that inevitably come into play, the collegial game 
takes into account the issue at hand, the persuasiveness of the argument, the majority 
author, the social environment and the judicial bargaining process. Judicial interaction 
2 7 7
 From Wilson's appointment to the bench in 1982, to the end of the Lamer Court in 1999, Wilson, 
L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin accounted for 46% of disagreement on the Dickson and Lamer Courts, 
writing 407 minority opinions out of roughly 1028. Three out of twenty-eight judges are responsible for 
almost half of the Supreme Court's disagreement is a mind-boggling discovery. 
2 7 8
 McCormick, Peter, "With Respect...-Levels of Disagreement on the Lamer Court 1990-2000" McGill 
Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1, (2003), 91. 
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makes decision making less about just finding the single correct legal answer, which 
increases in difficulty depending on the contentiousness of the issue, and more about the 
actual process of adjudication. This being the case, studying the decision making process 
becomes invaluable to understanding the courts and the decisions that are passed down. 
Disagreement behaviour is an effective way of exploring and ultimately explaining the 
decision making process. 
Why are the courts worth studying? The Supreme Court is not in the business of 
dispute resolution, although inevitably that function is served. National High Courts 
answer major questions of law ensuring the proper application of legal rules and the 
administration of justice by government branches. In Canada, the entrenchment of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms moved the Supreme Court from the realms of obscurity 
to the forefront of the political game. Mandated with the welfare of the Constitution and 
the protection of civil liberties in Canada, the Court's authority over public policy 
escalated to unprecedented highs. "The judicial lawmakers, not John A. Macdonald or 
Sir Francis Reilly, are the real authors of Canadian Constitutional law... Occasionally the 
decisions of the judicial lawmakers have encouraged the political actors to seek 
compromise solutions. But on the whole it has been the judges themselves who have 
decided or been forced by circumstance to rewrite the law they have written." John 
Say well concluded his book, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of 
Canadian Federalism with these compelling words, summing up the influence of the 
Supreme Court on the political process. What began as an independent, impartial 
tribunal, designed to mediate provincial/federal disputes, has evolved into a powerful 
279 
Saywell, John T., The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, (2002), 308. 
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entity never envisioned at its inception in 1875. For this reason, the Court merits our 
attention. 
Although there are many stones left unturned and countless questions 
unanswered, one conclusion can be reached - disagreement behaviour cannot be 
underestimated. The academic world is starting to realize the value of the minority 
opinion and research in this area has only just begun. Classifying and categorizing 
minority opinions maps out the topography of disagreement and lays the foundation for 
future study. What judicial disagreement looks like answers only some of the questions, 
and leaves me wondering what else can be discovered? 
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